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In the case of homogeneous1 populations progressive taxation is usually associated with a 
reduction of inequality in after tax income distribution. In the real world, populations of tax payers 
are not homogeneous and households differ not only with respect to income but also in other social, 
demographic and economic characteristics. The aim of the paper is to propose an inequality 
reducing tax system taking into account, in some way, differences in needs between tax payers. 
A population of households is considered and each household is distinguished by two attributes: 
pre-tax income and family size. To compare incomes in this heterogeneous environment an affine 
transformation is proposed as equivalent income function, from which income dependent 
equivalence scales are derived. 
By first, the horizontal equity concern of a tax system has to be faced. Ebert and Lambert (2004) 
define horizontal equity requirements for income dependent scales. Applying the proposed scales a 
tax system can be derived and we show that it satisfies the horizontal equity conditions as defined 
by two authors.  
Then, we consider the redistributive effects of a tax system by introducing an inequality 
parameterized measure as in Ebert and Moyes (2000). We show that, when the reference type 
family is fixed, the application of the suggested equivalence income function is such that the tax 
system can be overall inequality reducing provided that the reference type tax function is average 
rate or minimal progressive.  
As it is known, conditions ensuring that a tax system is overall inequality reducing are not 
sufficient to guarantee inequality reduction within each set of households with the same size. We 
derive restrictions which allow the equivalent income function to generate a tax system which is 
overall inequality reducing and within type inequality reducing. These restrictions concern the tax 
function for the reference family type and the domain of incomes. 
To see where these restrictions come from, it is important to note that a tax system which is overall 
inequality reducing for a fixed reference may well increase inequality (or keep it unaltered) when 
another reference type is chosen. But, if a tax system is within type inequality reducing, it is also 
overall inequality reducing for any reference type. Ebert and Moyes (2000) show that only two 
particular form of equivalence function can be adopted when reference independence is required. 
The first function yields an income independent absolute scale; the second function yields an 
income independent relative. The former has to be used when inequality is considered from the 
absolute point of view, the latter has to be used when an intermediate between absolute and relative 
concept of inequality is adopted or when relative inequality is considered. 
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1 Population of income units of the same type, that is with the same relevant social and demographic characteristics. 
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Here we suggest only an income transformation function which originates income depending scales. 
On considering inequality either in absolute or in relative sense, using this function we obtain a tax 
system which is overall inequality reducing and reference independent if some restrictions hold on 
income domain, on the set of taxable income and on the tax function for the reference type: we 
think that these restrictions are not too limitative as it can be understood from the applicative part. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first part, following Ebert-Lambert (2004), horizontal 
equity (HE) conditions are defined in both cases when equivalence scales are income dependent or 
income independent. Then, following Ebert-Moyes (2000), we summarize what has to be meant for 
an overall inequality reducing tax system (OIR), for a within type inequality reducing (WIR) tax 
system and for a reference independent tax system (RI).  
In the second part the paper we describe the particular affine income transformation function that 
we adopt and we investigate on the conditions allowing to this function to generate a tax system 
which is OIR and WIR. 
In the third part we simulate modifications to the present personal income tax in Poland, with the 
aim to design a more family oriented system. 
The paper is completed by an appendix which analyzes the relation among the most important 
instruments used in the real world to take into account horizontal equity. Quotient, exemption and 
tax credit are discussed under different hypotheses on tax function.  
1 NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS 
In § 1.1 we introduce the notion of equivalent income function: this function can be used to 
evaluate the purchasing capability of households which, being heterogeneous in their size, face 
different cost levels to reach the same living standards. The equivalent income function converts the 
income of a generic family into the income necessary to the reference family to enjoy the same 
welfare as the former and vice versa. The choice of the reference family is arbitrary: usually it falls 
on the single or on the couple without children. In this paragraph we reassume the general 
characteristics and properties of equivalent income functions. In § 1.2 the horizontal equity 
principle is recalled. Remembering that, from the classical point of view, horizontal equity calls for 
equal tax treatment for equals, one considers two different households as equal, when they both 
present the same equivalent income. In accordance with Ebert and Lambert (2004) we report 
conditions intended to secure horizontal equity with respect to relative or absolute equivalence 
scales, which may be either independent or dependent on family incomes.  The main technical 
instruments adopted in real world to pursue horizontal equity in personal income tax systems are 
summarized at the end of § 1.2. 
Paragraph 1.3 describes how tax progression reduces income distribution inequality. As Ebert 
and Moyes (2000) show, on considering homogeneous population, the definition of progression is 
strictly linked to the adopted definition of inequality. They introduce a parameterized criterion 
which allows to evaluate either inequality of income distributions or progression of a tax system 
when different concepts of inequality hold. Under some conditions, the relation between 
progression and inequality can be extended to heterogeneous population. As it is well known, in 
heterogeneous environments, the evaluation about income distribution inequality can be performed 
only when nominal incomes are transformed into equivalent incomes: the transformation is carried 
on with respect to a specific household type which is chosen as the reference one. When there is a 
social agreement on the reference household, one can state conditions insuring that the post-tax 
income distribution is not more unequal than the pre-tax distribution. If a tax system respects these 
conditions, it reduces overall inequality: that is, the tax system reduces inequality whatever pre-tax 
income distribution and family sizes. But two questions have to be remarked. The first is that 
overall inequality reduction does not ensure inequality reduction in income distributions of each 
type of household. The second point is that the redistributive impact of the tax system depends on 
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the chosen reference type, i.e same conditions cannot guarantee income inequality reduction if 
another reference family type is selected. More severe conditions are requested in order a tax 
system to be both overall inequality reducing and within type inequality reducing, or, equivalently, 
reference independent.2  These conditions are summarized the last part of § 1.3. 
1.1  Equivalent income function  
In this section we define the meaning of the equivalent income function  and we recall a class of 
functions proposed by Donaldson and Pendakur (1999) to which the function adopted in the second 
part of the paper belongs. 
Let us consider a population consisting of N households, where each household is distinguished 
by two attributes: pre-tax income and family size3. Supposing that there exists a given and finite 
number of family sizes, let H= {1, 2, i,.. n} represent the set of possible family sizes and let D pre-
tax income domain. The set H is typically assumed to be a subset of positive integers, and D is the 
set, or a subset, of real number. 
In order to measure welfare and to make comparisons of living standards among households with 
different number of components, we assume that there is a decision maker able to propose a suitable 
utility function4. Let us denote as y D∈  and i H∈ , respectively, the pre-tax income and the size of 
a household. The welfare function of a representative member of the household of size i is U(y,i), 
here abbreviated with Ui(y). The function Ui(y) is assumed to be a) continuous, increasing and 
invertible in y; b) non increasing in i.  
Given a reference type household r, the equivalent income function Sr,i(y) specifies the 
transformation that converts the income of household i into the reference household equivalent 
income. The equivalent income is the income needed by the reference household in order to be as 
well off as household i, when the latter’s income is y. 
Formally, we can write5 
 
 ( ) ( )( ),i r r iU y U S y=   for all y D∈  and r, i H∈  (1) 
 
Taking as reference type the r size household, the welfare index Ui(·), for each family of type i 
(i=1,2,…,n), may be expressed as function of the welfare index of household r. For any value of y, 
Sr,i(y) is equal to the income the reference household r needs in order to be as well off as household 
i possessing income y. For example let be yi type i household’s income, then 
 
yr,i=Sr,i(yi)  
 
                                                 
2 As Ebert and Moyes (2000, page 137) write, a tax system is reference independent when it is both overall inequality 
reducing and within type inequality reducing. 
3 For the sake of simplicity, we consider only a socio-demographic characteristic: the family dimension. 
4 In order to derive an equalizing procedure by a social welfare function, an individual utility function U has to be: 
(a) continuous;  
(b) strictly increasing in y;  
(c) non-increasing in i 
(d) having the same image in D for all i; 
(e) concave; 
(f) U and U are informationally equivalent if there is a function F(y) =a + by, b>0, such that U= a+b U 
Properties (b) and (d) imply that U(·) is invertible.  
Property (f) implies that U(·) is a cardinal full comparable utility function. 
For more on this argument see Ebert (2000). 
5 We remark that in expression (1), the equivalent income function S(.) depends on the welfare function U(.): the 
specification of S(.), as well as the specification of the welfare function U(.), depends on the decision maker value 
judgments. 
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is r type household’s equivalent income. 
Employing S(.), household’s living standards can be compared and a household j is (weakly) 
better off than a household i if and only if Sr,i(yi)≤ Sr,j(yj). In other words, welfare is defined as that 
yielded by the reference household at S(.): the equivalent income is a welfare measure. 
From (1) and from the properties of the welfare function U (see note 4), the following properties6 
hold for S(.): 
 
(a) Sr,r(y) = Sr,r(y)= ( ) yyUU rr =− ?1   
(b) Sr,i(y) is continuous and increasing in y for all r,i H∈ ; 
(c) Sr,i(y) = Sr,l(y)◦Sl,i(y); 
(d) Sr,i(y) is non increasing in i for all i H∈ and y D∈ . 
 
Having defined7 the equivalent income function8, it can be observed that the conventional 
equivalence scale approach assumes a proportional transformation of income. In this case, using a 
deflator sdi(y), that may or not depend on income, one writes 
 
 ( ), ( ) ir i i i i
yS y
sd y
=    for all i  (2) 
if the deflator varies with income and  
 
 , ( ) ir i i
i
yS y
sd
=     for all i   (2a) 
if the deflator is income independent. 
We define sdi(y) in expression (2) as the relative equivalence scale, whilst the general form for 
an absolute equivalence scale, say sa(y), satisfies the following expression: 
 
 , ( ) ( )r i i i i iS y y sa y= −  (3) 
 
If the absolute scale is income independent, that is if sa (y) = sa, expression (3) becomes: 
 
  , ( )r i i i iS y y sa= −  (3a) 
 
Ebert and Lambert (2004) observe that sdi(y) can be turned into the form of an absolute scale, 
and, conversely, sai(y) can be turned into the form of a relative scale. Specifically: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
111 i iii i i i i
i i i i i i
sd yysa y y y y
sd y sd y sd y
   −= − = − =         
 (4) 
and 
  ( ) ( )ii i i i i
ysd y
y sa y
= −   (5) 
 
                                                 
6 We write Sr,i(yi) = Sr,l◦ Sl,i(yi) instead of Sr,i(yi) = Sr,l(Sl,i(yi)). 
7 Ebert and Moyes (2000, page. 129) list a further property: Sr,i(D)=D. They explain that this property is a direct 
consequence of the previous conditions. This property imposes that the nominal income interval D is mapped in the 
same interval irrespective of the type of the household. 
8 For more details on this function, see Donaldson Pendakur (1999), Ebert (2000) and Ebert and Moyes (2000). 
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We stress that a relative income independent scale sd, when turned into an absolute scale, becomes 
income dependent and, vice versa, an absolute income independent scale sa, when turned into a 
relative scale, becomes income dependent. 
An improved specification of expression (3) is proposed by Donaldson and Pendakur (1999). 
Their starting point is the remark that expression (3a) implies that equal absolute increases of 
income preserve utility equality across household types. In fact, from: ( ), ,r i r iy S y=  one has 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ), ,( )i i r r i r i i r r iU y U S U y sa U y= = − =  (6) 
 
that is, the i type household with income yi and the reference type with income yi-dai have the same 
welfare. It follows that, if yi varies, the equality  
 
  ( ) ( )irirriii dyyUdyyU ,, +=+  (7) 
 
is verified if and only if incomes increase exactly by the same amount (dyi=dyr,i). 
This is a quite restrictive assumption, alternatively, one can require the weaker condition that the 
change in the reference household’s income that preserves utility equality is income independent. 
This implies the existence of a function ρ(i)>0 such that 
 
 ( ) iir dyidy ρ=,  (8) 
 
i.e. a one unity money increase in household income requires an increase of ρ(i) unity of money to 
preserve equality of well-being, whatever the income value is.  
Integrating, one obtains, for ρ(r)=1 and some function α(i) with α(r)=0, the equivalent income 
function 
  ( ) ( )iyiy iir αρ +=.   (8a) 
 
Expression (8a) may be rewritten in the more usual form 
 
 ,
( )
( )
i
r i
y A iy
R i
−=   (8b) 
 
with ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )  and 1A i i i R i iα ρ ρ=− = . From (8b), an affine absolute equivalence scale, depending 
on the income value, can be obtained 
 
  ( )( )
( ( ) 1)
( ) ii i
R i y A i
sa y
R i
− +=   (9) 
 
The absolute scale (9) is increasing (decreasing) in yi, if R(i)>1 (R(i)<1) 
The relative equivalence scale sdi(yi) is given by 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
i
i
i
R i y
sd y
y A i
= −   (9a) 
 
which is increasing (decreasing) in y if A(i)<0 (A(i)>0). 
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1.2  Horizontal equity defined using equivalent income function 
Let Y represent the income distribution and for a household, with pre-tax income y, let the tax 
liability t(y) be a continuous9 and non decreasing function in y. If the population is homogeneous, 
the tax system may be represented by the net income schedule ( ) ( )v y y t y= −  which is, by 
assumption, continuous and non decreasing in pre-tax income y. In a non homogeneous population, 
let t(y,i)=ti(yi) represent the tax liability faced by the i type household with income yi and let ( ) ( )i i i i iv y y t y= −  represent i's net income schedule. 
Horizontal equity may be expressed, in accordance with Feldstein (1976, page 83) remarking 
that “if two individuals would be equally well-off in absence of taxation, they should be equally 
well-of if there is taxation”. That is, choosing r type as reference household and Sr,i(yi) as equivalent 
income function, if before taxation it holds (see expression 1) 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ),i i r r i i r rU y U S y U y= =  
 
the tax system is horizontal equitable if and only if relation (10) holds on net income  
 
 ( ) ( ),i i i i r r i r rU y t y U y t y  − = −     (10) 
In other words, H.E requires that if  
 
 ( ), ,r i r i iy S y=     for all i   (11) 
then it must be verified that10 
 , ,( ) [ ( )]r r i r i i iv y S v y=     for all i   (12) 
 
If the equivalent income function takes the form of the relative scale (see expression (2)), from (12) 
it follows that, to satisfy H.E. requirement11, one must have 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )ii i i i i r i i
yy sd y
sd y
ν ν ν  =    
 (13) 
 
Rearranging expression (13) one obtains H.E. condition on tax function 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )i ii i i i r i i i i i ri i i i
y yt y sd y t sd y sd y
sd y sd y
ν ν    = ⋅ + − ⋅          
 (14) 
 
It is easy to see that, if the relative scale is income independent, expression (13) and expression (14) 
assume, respectively, the simpler form 
 ( ) ii i i r
i
yy sd
sd
ν ν  = ⋅      (13a) 
 
 ( ) ii i i
i
yt y sd t
sd
 = ⋅   
  (14a) 
                                                 
9 Or almost continuous admitting a piecewise linear tax function. 
10 One may observe that (12) rewrites as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1, , , , ,i i r i r r i i r i r i i r r i iv y S v S y S S y t S y− −  = = −  ? ? . 
11 For more on this argument see Ebert and Lambert (2004). 
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When an absolute income dependent scale is applied (expression 3), the H.E requirement (11) 
specializes into the following form:  
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )i i r i i i i i iy y sa y sa yν ν ν= − +  (15) 
 
and from expression (15) the H.E. condition on tax function requires that:  
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )i i r i i i i i i i it y t y sa y sa y sa yν = − + −   (16) 
 
If the absolute scale is income independent, the H.E. condition on net income becomes:  
 
 ( ) ( )i i r i iy y saν ν= −  (15a) 
and condition on taxation yields: 
 ( ) ( )i i r i it y t y sa= −  (16a) 
1.3   Horizontal equity instruments 
In actual tax systems, various procedures are adopted in order to keep into account the fact that 
tax liability should be affected by difference in social and demographic characteristics of 
households with the same nominal income. Among the most important we list: income splitting, 
allowances, tax credits and the so called quotient familial, adopted in France and Luxemburg which 
extends the income splitting rules to other members of households. These procedures are the real 
world concession to the principle of horizontal equity: we shortly describe three of them12  
(a) quotients or splitting; 
(b) exemptions; 
(c) tax credit. 
 
The easiest and simplest way to apply the above instruments is to consider these instruments 
depending on household demographic characteristics only, taking them invariant with respect to 
income.  
Quotient: A tax calculated according to quotient has the following expression: 
 
 ( ) ii i i r
i
yt y q t
q
 =   
 (17) 
 
We observe that expression (17) is exactly the tax function given in (14a) if we put sdi equal to qi, 
that is (17) is the H.E. tax with a relative scale invariant with respect to income if qi = sdi.  
 
Income exemption A tax calculated according to exemption has the following expression: 
 
 ( ) ( )i i r i it y t y e= −  (18) 
 
(18) coincides with (15a) if we put sai = ei, that is (18) is the H.E. tax function with an absolute 
scale invariant with respect to income if sai = ei. 
 
                                                 
12 Actual tax systems often use mixtures of the three specified instruments. For instance, the German tax system adopts 
the splitting for spouses and exemptions for children. More on this argument is discussed in the Appendix 
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Tax credit A tax calculated according to tax credit has the following expression: 
 
 ( ) ( )i i r i it y t y c= −   (19) 
 
At the end of the last century, there was in economic literature a debate about the research of a 
rational background for a tax system applying tax credit. Lambert and Yitzhaki (1997) conclude 
that perhaps tax credit emerged as an administrative convenience but, from an utilitarian point of 
view, cannot be explained as a mean to implement horizontal and vertical equity. 
Here, we only observe that a tax credit satisfies horizontal equity commands when:  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )i r i r i i i i i i i ic t y t y sa y sa y sa yν = − − − − =   
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )i ir i i i r i i i i i ri i i i
y yt y sd y t sd y sd y
sd y sd y
ν ν    = − − −          
 (20) 
 
That is, an income independent tax credit can be horizontally equitable, if the functional form of the 
scale combines with the tax schedule in such a way to keep the difference between ( )i it y and 
( )r it y constant whatever y may be. 
It follows immediately that while the horizontal equitability of either an income independent 
quotient or of an income independent exemption does not depend on the tax schedule, the horizontal 
equitability of a tax credit probably is no longer verified when the tax schedule changes, with a 
scale that remains the same. 
A tax credit ci(yi) may be interpreted as the application of (16), if it is a function of income: we 
observe that in general expression (20) is a non decreasing function of income, it follows that in any 
case, ci(yi) should not be a decreasing function of y. The Appendix describes some relations 
between tax credit and family quotient or exemptions, when either the former or the latter is 
constant. 
In actual tax systems these three instruments can be applied in conjunction. Exemptions may be 
allowed to exclude from taxable income costs which should not be considered in equalized 
incomes. Tax credit can be introduced to subsidize particular costs13 for merit goods14.  
A tax system that uses an income dependent quotient as horizontal equity instrument, may adopt 
the following tax function:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )ii i i i r i i
yt y q y t
q y
 =    
  (21) 
 
It is important to note that to satisfy horizontal equity principle from (14) the quotient ( )i iq y  
should be such that:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )i i ii i r i i r i i i i i ri i i i i i
y y yq y t sd y t sd y sd y
q y sd y sd y
ν ν      = + −                
 (21a) 
 
Analogously, if there is an exemption which depends on income, the tax function assumes the form 
 
                                                 
13 For instance, the French system allows exemptions for income production expenses and then applies a family 
quotient. Tax credits are allowed for instruction costs.  
14 In the Italian the fiscal law subsidizes a percentage of building costs through tax credits. 
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 ( ) ( )( )i i r i i it y t y e y= −  (22) 
 
from (16) the horizontal equity principle is satisfied, if  
 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )r i i i r i i i i i i i it y e y t y sa y sa y sa yν − = − + −   (22a) 
1.4  Relation between inequality and progression in homogeneous and non homogeneous 
frameworks  
As it is well known, when a homogeneous population is considered, a progressive taxation 
system is characterized by two distributive features. First, tax liabilities are distributed more 
unequally than pre-tax incomes; second, post-tax incomes are distributed more equally than pre-tax 
income. The problem is how to make inequality comparisons in a non homogeneous framework. 
Ebert and Moyes (2000) answer this question in two steps. First they derive the relation existing 
between inequality and progression for homogeneous population and second they extend their 
results to the case of heterogeneous populations. In doing so, they state conditions that guarantee 
that the after-tax distribution is always no more unequal than the before tax distribution when there 
is agreement on a particular reference type and a particular equivalent function is chosen. In this 
case equivalent incomes are computed with respect to the chosen reference type and equivalent 
income distributions are compared. They observe that, when a tax system is required to be 
inequality reducing for each family size income distribution, this tax system is also reference 
independent. This is an important remark which will prove to be very useful to derive our results. 
Before doing that we shall summarize here the main results obtained by Ebert and Moyes 
When making inequality evaluations, following Atkinson (1970) one can appeal to the relative 
Lorenz criterion or, following Kolm (1976), to the absolute Lorenz criterion15. In this paper, 
following Ebert and Moyes (2000), we adopt a parametric approach that encompasses both absolute 
and relative Lorenz criterion.16 This is based on the θ Lorenz criterion.  
Given a parameter θ [ ]1,0∈   
 
 ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )1
1
/
, /
/ 1
k
j j
n
j ii
w y
L k
w
θ
µ θθµ θ= =
 −= + + −  ∑∑
y w
y w
y w
;  k=1,2……,N  (23) 
 
is the θ Lorenz curve for the income distribution Y; in (23) wi is the sample weight assigned to 
household i (i=1,2,…N) and µ(y/w) is the weighted mean of the distribution. According to this 
criterion, a distribution is less unequal than another distribution, if the θ Lorenz curve of the former 
dominates the θ Lorenz curve of the latter17. 
It is easy to see that when θ=0, expression (23) reduces to the absolute Lorenz curve and, when θ=1, 
(23) becomes the relative Lorenz curve. 
                                                 
15 Adopting the relative criterion, a distribution is no less unequal than another distribution if its relative curve is 
nowhere below the relative curve of the other distribution. The absolute Lorenz criterion plays a similar role, drawing 
upon the comparison of the absolute Lorenz curves of the distributions. In current practice the relative criterion is the 
most used, because of its connection with relative inequality measures. 
16 For more on this approach see Bossert and Pfigsten (1990). 
17 Let us introduce the function ( ) ( )1 θ θ ξ θ− =  decreasing in θ. The θ Lorenz criterion is well defined for  
( ) ( )/µ ξ θ> −y w . 
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Adopting the θ Lorenz criterion to measure inequality, the same parameter can be introduced to 
evaluate the progression of the tax system18. Following Ebert and Moyes (2000) a tax function t(y) 
is θ progressive if 
 
 θθ −+1
)(
y
yt   (24) 
 
is non decreasing19 in income y. Or, equivalently, the net income function v(y) is θ progressive if 
 
 ( )
1
v y y
yθ θ
−
+ −  (25) 
is non increasing in income20 y. 
If one supposes θ=0, by definition θ progression implies a tax function ( )t y  increasing w.r.t. 
income. It means that when absolute inequality is considered minimal progression21 of tax function 
is required. 
If θ=1, definition of θ progression implies  ( )[ ] 0/ ≥
dy
yytd  and then ( ) ( )' t yt y
y
≥ . It follows that, 
when relative inequality is considered, marginal tax rate cannot be lower than average tax rate22. 
When relative inequality is considered, average rate progression of the tax function is required.  
If 0<θ<1, θ progression implies ( ) / 1d t y y
dy
θ θ+ −    and then ( ) ( )( )' 1
t y
t y
y θ θ≥ + − . 
  
Being  
0 1
1 1 10,     lim ,    lim 0  θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ→ →
− − −> = ∞ =  
one has ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
0 1
lim 0     lim    
1 1
t y t y t y
y y yθ θθ θ θ θ→ →= =+ − + −  
 
and then, noting that ( ) ( )1 θ θ ξ θ− = is decreasing in θ (see note 17), one has: 
 ( )
( )
( )0
1
t y t y
y yθ θ< <+ −  
 
It follows that, when θ varies inside its range, θ progression requires that marginal rate must not be 
lower than a quantity smaller than average tax rate.  
                                                 
18 For more on progression concept see Pfingsten (1988).  
19 We remember that if θ=1, strict progression requires ( )t y y  increases with y. Relaxing the condition and considering 
a non decreasing function, means to admit into the analysis the case of a tax which is zero below a threshold, as well as 
taxes with linear portion and fully proportional taxes. For more on this question see Lambert (2001). 
20 The set of income values has to be restricted to ( )y ξ θ> − to satisfy the requirement of θ progression. Let us suppose 
θ=0.2: substituting into expression (25) we have ( ) ( )( ( ) ) (0.2 1 0.2) 0.2 4y t y y y t y y − − + − = − +  . The ratio 
conserves its sign and the function its behaviour only if (1 0,2) 0,2 4y > − − = − .Obviously this is true for all value of θ.  
21 The minimal concept of progression is due to Fei (1981): it requires that t(y) is non decreasing in y.  
22 That is the so called Fellman (1976) and Jacobsson (1976) concept of progression. 
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Ebert and Moyes show that, in homogeneous environment, if a tax system is θ progressive, than 
the post-tax θ Lorenz curve dominates the pre-tax θ Lorenz curve. They state this as: 
 
PROPOSITION 1 (Ebert and Moyes, 2000). θ progression is both necessary and sufficient condition 
for θ inequality reducing. 
 
The value of the parameter θ stresses the connection between inequality and progression. Inequality 
concept determines the progression concept, and the choice of an inequality concept is a value 
judgment. Now this result has to be extended to heterogeneous population.  
When facing inequality comparisons for an heterogeneous population, first of all an equivalent 
income function Sr,i has to be introduced to transform nominal incomes for non homogeneous 
families into equivalent incomes with respect to reference family r. Then, weighting the obtained 
equivalent incomes with a suitable system of weights, the θ Lorenz criterion is applied to the 
obtained distributions.  
On considering equivalent incomes, calculated with respect to a particular reference family, the 
tax system is overall inequality reducing if θ Lorenz curve of the post-tax equivalent incomes lies 
above the θ Lorenz curve of pre-tax equivalent incomes, whatever the distribution of pre-tax 
income is.  
Ebert and Moyes show that a tax system is overall inequality reducing, if the following necessary 
and sufficient conditions are satisfied 
 
PROPOSITION 2  (Ebert and Moyes, 2000). A tax system is overall (θ) inequality reducing if and only 
if 
 
a2. ( ) ( )1, ,i r i r r iv y S v S y−= ? ?   
b2. ( ) ( )( )ytyyv rr −=  is θ progressive. 
 
In other words, provided that the equivalence function S(·) is the right way to compare the tax 
capability among household with different size and that the tax function is θ inequality reducing for 
the reference family, the tax system is overall inequality reducing.  
It is important to observe that any tax system is overall inequality reducing if it satisfies 
requirements a2 and b2. We emphasize that in proposition 2 there is not any particular requirement 
either on the form of the equivalent income function or on the form of the tax function. One can 
choose any tax function, provided that it is θ progressive for the reference family, and any 
equivalent income function provided that a2 is satisfied. It means that functional separability holds 
between the considerations underlying the tax system for the reference family and the evaluations of 
needs among families possessing different characteristics, expressed by the equivalent income 
function.  
We underline that the model, we are discussing about, is founded on two main value judgments: the 
former (see note 5) concerns the utility function from which the equivalent income function is 
derived and the latter involves the inequality concept which reflects on the progression of the tax 
system. As conditions a2 and b2 are not related, the two value judgments are independent.  
One has to observe that, on fixing the equivalent income function for pre-tax income distribution 
and asking condition a2 to be satisfied, we require that the tax system satisfies horizontal equity 
condition23. Then, for a given reference family, it seems possible to say that a tax system is overall 
θ inequality reducing, if it is horizontally equitable and if the tax function is θ progressive for the 
reference type. 
But it is not granted that inequality is reduced within each homogeneous family type. Moreover, the 
redistributive effects of the tax system depends on the particular family chosen as the reference one. 
                                                 
23 See expression (12) and note 10.  
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This means that if a tax system is inequality reducing when family r is selected as the reference one, 
the same tax system may be not necessarily inequality reducing when another family typology is 
selected as reference.  
To grant that inequality is reduced within each homogeneous family type, it must hold what 
follows 
 
PROPOSITION 3  (Ebert and Moyes, 2000). A tax system is within type reference independent (WIR), 
if and only if  
 
(i)  the tax schedule for a particular reference family r, tr(y), is θ progressive24  
 
(ii) there exist an equivalent income function ,r iS  such that: 
 
 vi(y)= 1, ,r i r r iS v S
− ? ?    is θ progressive for all   i H∈  
 
As observed by Ebert and Moyes (2000, page 137), within type inequality reduction and reference 
independence are equivalent, provided that the tax system is overall inequality reducing. But 
imposing reference independence has a consequence: it is no longer possible to design overall 
inequality reducing tax system, whatever the chosen reference type for any arbitrary equivalent 
income function. 
More precisely, the authors state the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 4  (Ebert and Moyes, 2000). Given an equivalent income function S an inequality 
concept θ and a system of weight w, suppose that there exists a reference type r such that the tax 
system is θ overall inequality reducing. Then the tax system is reference independent if and only if 
 
a3.  ( ), ,          r i r iS y yα= +  for all r,i H∈  when θ=0 
b3.  ( ) ( )( ) ( ), ,r i r iS y yβ ζ θ ξ θ= − −        for all r,i H∈  when 0<θ 1≤  
 
In other words, the price to pay in order to obtain either within type inequality reduction or 
reference independence consists in giving up the independence between inequality concept and 
equivalent income function. 
But this drastic consequence has to be interpreted in a right way. “Proposition 4 does not mean 
that a tax system verifying condition in Proposition 2 cannot at all be reference independent but 
rather that, without introducing further restrictions, there are no guarantee that any tax system 
defined by Proposition 2 will be overall inequality reducing whatever the reference type” (Ebert and 
Moyes, 2000, page 141). 
In the second part of the paper a particular tax system is selected which seems to be overall 
inequality reducing for any reference family type, with some restrictions on the tax schedule and on 
the income domain. 
2 AN AFFINE EQUIVALENT INCOME FUNCTION AND ITS PROPERTIES 
As stated in the last section, no relation is required between the inequality concept and the 
form of the equivalent income function, for a tax system to be overall inequality reducing,. 
                                                 
24 Then vr(y) is θ progressive too.  
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This independence no longer holds if the tax system has to be both overall and within type 
inequality reducing. In this case, the equivalent income function and the adopted inequality concept 
cannot be separated. Proposition 4 maintains that two equivalent income functions have to be 
considered: the former when absolute inequality is evaluated, the latter when relative or  an 
intermediate inequality concept is taken into account. In this section, we introduce an income 
transformation function which is a particular case of the affine function defined at (8b).  
We discuss this function in § 2.1. In section 2.2, supposing θ=0 and θ=1, we investigate how the 
adopted function can yield a tax system either overall inequality reducing and reference 
independent. 
2.1 The adopted equivalent income function  
Following Ebert (2000), it is assumed that each household with the same characteristics has 
identical preferences and that each household member enjoys the same level of utility. The 
equivalent income function is then generated by a utility function that, for the representative 
individual of the i-type family, takes the form: 
 
 ( ) ii
i
yU y h
m
γ −=      (26) 
 
where h(.) is a suitable function. The parameter iγ  represents the subsistence income of the i type 
family, while parameter mi takes into account the needs of household i over the subsistence level. 
Both iγ and im  depends on the characteristics of the family, which are here restricted to its 
composition; the parameters are considered as exogenous25. The values of the parameters im  are 
supposed to be positive, those of the parameters iγ  are assumed to be non negative for all i; we 
stress that they do not depend on income, but only on family characteristics. Both iγ and im  are 
assumed to be non-decreasing with respect to the family dimension expressed by i; at least one im  
is different from 1 and one iγ  is different from zero. In the pursue, we will consider the tax 
liabilities for families with different incomes and sizes. We assume that no tax areas may differ for 
each type of households and that parameters γi represent no tax area thresholds. In this framework 
we will consider ( ) [ ]( ) 0i i iU y h y mγ= − ≤  for all iy γ≤ . This means that we assume i type 
families with income iy γ≤  have no tax capability.  
Summarizing: 
 
(1)  im >0 for all i; 
(2)  iγ ≥0 for all i; 
(3)  mi ≥mh, i hγ γ≥ , if i>h. 
 
From (26), it follows that a generic i-type family enjoys a given utility level u , if its income yi is 
such that:  
 
 ( )i i iy m g uγ= + ⋅  (27) 
 
                                                 
25 The value of the parameters is assigned by the decision maker to pursue political goals; they can be also estimated by 
proper methods (e.g. econometric methods). 
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where g(.) is the inverse function of h(.).  
From (27), it immediately follows that we can express ( )g u  as a function of income for a reference 
family of type r; in doing so we obtain: 
 
  ( ) r r
r
yg u
m
γ−=   (27’) 
 
Obtaining ( )g u  from the above expression, if we substitute (27’) into (27), we get that the income 
level yi, which is necessary to families of type i to attain the utility level u , can be expressed as a 
function of the income level yr,i, that allows the reference family r to enjoy the same utility level 
u as family of type i does. 
Then: 
,
i i
i i r r i
r r
m my y
m m
γ γ= − ⋅ + ⋅  
 
yr,i is defined as the equivalent income (that is the income which gives to r type an utility level equal 
to the utility level enjoyed by i type). Given the income iy  for the i type family, yr,i can be obtained 
from the relation26:  
 ( ) ( ), , r i rr i r i i i i r r i i
i r i
m m my S y y y
m m m
γ γ γ γ = = − + = + −    (28) 
 
We now verify that expression (28) satisfies the properties listed in §1.1 for an equivalent 
income function. 
 
PROPERTY (a): Sr,r(y) = Sr,r(y)= ( )1r rU U y y− =? .  
Considering (28), it is easy to see that  
( ) ( ), rr r r r r r
r
yS y m g u m y
m
γγ γ −= + ⋅ = + ⋅ =  
 
PROPERTY (b): Sr,i(y) is continuous and increasing in y for all r,i H∈ . 
Sr,i(y) is actually continuous in y. The derivative of Sr,i(y) w.r.t. y is 
 
,r i r
i
dS m
dy m
=  for all y D∈ . 
 
By assumption im >0, for all i H∈ , this derivative is positive. 
 
PROPERTY (c): ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,r i r h h iS y S y S y= ? . 
To test the property (c), that is path independence, we must verify that  
 
( ) ( )( ), , ,r i r h h iS y S S y =    
 
                                                 
26 Observe that if all γi where zero, (28) would collapse to , ( )r i iS y y sd=  (see expression (2a) in §1.1), whilst if all mi 
where 1, it would simplify into , ( )r i iS y y sa= − (see expression (3a) in §1.1). 
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Now, from expression (28), taking type h as the reference family, one has 
 
( ) ( ), hh i h i
i
mS y y
m
γ γ= + −  
then 
 
( )( ) ( )
( )
( )
, , ,
,
r
r h h i r h i h
h
r i r
r h h h r i
h i i
r i
mS S y S y
m
m y mm y
m m m
S y
γ γ
γγ γ γ γ γ
  = + − =   
  −= + + − = + − =    
=
 
 
and so the property is verified. 
From property (c) it follows immediately that ( )( ), ,r i i rS S y y  =  , as it can be easily verified 
substituting h with i and i with r in the above expression 
 
 ( ) ( ), , rr i i r r r
r
mS S y y y
m
γ γ= + − =    
 
PROPERTY (d): Sr,i(y) is non increasing in i for all i H∈ and y D∈ . 
Property (d) implies ( ) ( ), ,r h r iS y S y≥ for h<i. Considering expression (28), property (d) is verified 
if it holds: 
 
     with  and h h r i i r i h i h
h i
y m y m m m
m m
γ γ γ γ γ γ− + − +≥ ≥ ≥  (29) 
 
When i hm m=  inequality (29) is satisfied if i hγ γ≥ . Then, being, by assumption, γi non decreasing 
in i, in this case property (d) is always satisfied. 
If i hm m> , solving (29) for y one obtains:  
 
 h i i h
i h
m my
m m
γ γ−≥ −   (29’) 
 
The value of the ratio at the r.h.s. of the above inequality is always smaller than γh: it is exactly γh 
when h iγ γ= . We remember that for h type families the taxable income domain is h hy γ≥ : then 
inequality (29’) is always satisfied in the taxable income domain. Nevertheless, inequality (29’) 
imposes severe restrictions on values of parameters. Indeed, the sign of the ratio may be positive or 
negative. Being  
 
0h i i h
i h
m m
m m
γ γ− >−  
 
it would imply that only a particular set of positive y satisfies inequality (29). This case should to be 
avoided. 
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The sign of the ratio is not positive 0h i i h
i h
m m
m m
γ γ − ≤ − 
 if  
 
 
h
i
h
i
m
m
γ
γ≤   for h iγ γ≠  (30) 
 
So, if one considers only non negative income, inequality (30) should be sufficient27 to ensure that 
Sr,i(y) is decreasing28 in i for all y R+∈ .  
Summing up, PROPERTY (d) is satisfied if one considers R+  as income domain and fixing the scale 
at the subsistence level, expressed by the ratio between iγ  and hγ , higher than the scale for income 
levels over subsistence expressed by im  and hm . When these restrictions hold, expression (28) may 
be considered an equivalent income function. 
2.2  Properties of the adopted equivalent income function 
Without any loss of generality, one can put 1rm =  for the reference family and, consequently, 
rescale all the other coefficients im . According with expression (9) and (9a) in § 1.1, which are 
respectively, ( ) ( )( ) ( ( ) 1)i i isa y R i y A i R i = − +  and ( ) ( ) ( )isd y R i y y A i = −   
the equivalent income function ( ) ( ),r i i r i i iS y y mγ γ= + − , defined in expression (28), leads to the 
following absolute scale: 
 
 ( ) ( )1i i i i ri i
i
m y m
sa y
m
γ γ− ⋅ + − ⋅=  (31) 
 
or to the relative scale: 
 
 ( ) i ii i
i i i r
m ysd y
y mγ γ
⋅= − + ⋅  (32) 
Both scales (31) and (32) depend on income. 
                                                 
27 Of course if i<h it must hold 
 ( ), ,     ;  r i r h i h i hS S m m γ γ≥ < <  
and condition (30) becomes h h
i i
m
m
γ
γ≥  
28 Remember that it is common practice to normalize m coefficients imposing mr=1. In this case inequality (29’) 
becomes  
if i>r  ( 1;  )i r i rm m γ γ> = >   1
r i i
i
m
y
m
γ γ−≥ −  
as ( )1im − >0, condition (30) requires ( )r i imγ γ− <0  that is  ii
r
m
γ
γ≤   
if i<r  
 ( 1;  )i r i rm m γ γ< = <   1
i r i
i
m
y
m
γ γ−≥ −  
as ( )1 im− >0, condition (30) requires  ( )i r imγ γ− <0  that is ii
r
m
γ
γ≥   
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Let us recall horizontal equity conditions when scale are income dependent. The H.E. condition on 
tax function is (see expression 16): 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )i i r i i i i i i i it y t y sa y sa y sa yν = − + −   
 
when an absolute scale is used, while 
the H.E. condition on tax function is (see expression 14): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )i ii i i i r i i i i i ri i i i
y yt y sd y t sd y sd y
sd y sd y
ν ν    = + −          
 
 
when the relative scale is used. 
 
Substituting sai(y) given in (31) into expression (16), or sdi(y) given in (32) into expression (14), 
after some passages, one obtains the tax function for i type families  
 
 ( ) i i i ri i i r
i
y mt y m t
m
γ γ − + ⋅= ⋅      (33) 
 
The tax function in (33) ensures that the horizontal equity condition on post tax incomes 
( ) ( )1, ,i r i r r iv y S v S y−= ? ?  (see expression 12 and note 10) is respected29. 
Then, our first result is that the tax system defined by ( ) ( ),r i i r i i iS y y mγ γ= + −  and 
( ) ( )i i i r i i i r it y m t y m mγ γ = ⋅ − + ⋅   is horizontally equitable.  
As said above (see proposition 2 in § 1.4), a tax system is overall θ inequality reducing if horizontal 
equity condition on net income is respected and if the tax function is θ progressive 30 for the 
reference type r. Then, supposing that there is accord on r as reference type and provided that the 
tax function ( )t y  is θ progressive for r type, the above specified tax system is overall θ inequality 
reducing. This is our second result. 
It remains to verify if a tax function as in expression (33) originates a tax system which can be also 
within type inequality reducing and then reference independent. 
As observed in § 1.4 reference independence and within type inequality reduction are equivalent, 
provided that the tax system is overall inequality reducing. Remembering that, if a tax system is 
overall inequality reducing, within type inequality reduction requires that the tax system is θ 
progressive for all i H∈ (see proposition 3), we verify WIR and, in so doing, we test also RI.  
One has to remember that proposition 4 of § 1.4 lists two equivalent income functions: the first has 
to be considered when θ=0, the second when 0 1θ< ≤ ; if and only if these functions are used any 
OIR tax system is reference independent. Concentrating our attention on the two main cases: θ=1 
(average rate progression) and θ=0 (minimal progression) we propose a single equivalent income 
function: ( ) ( ),r i i r i i iS y y mγ γ= + −  and we try to seek out if there exists particular conditions 
under which the tax function ( ) ( )i i i r i i i r it y m t y m mγ γ = ⋅ − + ⋅   guarantees reference independence. 
                                                 
29 In fact: ( ) ( ) ( )( ),r r i r i i i r r i i iv S y y m t y mγ γ γ γ= + − − + −?  
and ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1, ,r i r r i i i i i i r r i i i i i r r i i iS v S y m y m t y m y m t y mγ γ γ γ γ γ−  = + ⋅ − − + − = − ⋅ + − ? ? . 
30 We remember that the definition of θ progression requires that ( )( ) 1t y yθ θ+ − (expression 24) is non decreasing 
in y.  
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For what above reported, checking within type inequality reduction is equivalent to verify that  
 
 ( )
1 1
i i i r
i r
i i i
i i
y mm t
t y m
y y
γ γ
θ θ θ θ
 − + ⋅  =⋅ + − ⋅ + −  (34) 
 
is not decreasing in yi for all i. 
It is important to note that, differently than Ebert and Moyes, we analyze the behavior of 
expression (34), restricting the income domain to R+ and that, for each family type, we 
consider i iy γ≥  as taxable incomes, being ( ) 0  for i it y y γ= ≤   
 
(a) When θ=0, (34) is non decreasing in y if  
 
 ' 0i i i rr
i
y mt
m
γ γ − + ⋅ ≥    (35) 
 
We remember that in homogeneous environment tax function is non decreasing w.r.t. income 
(see §1.4). Then, on considering the set of household with size r, inequality (35) holds and, 
consequently, (34) is non decreasing in y for all i. In the case of minimal progression, unlike Ebert 
and Moyes, we are not constrained to impose 1im i H= ∀ ∈  because we have restricted the income 
domain to R+. 
 
(b) When θ=1, the first derivative of expression (34) w.r.t. yi is not negative, that is (34) is a non 
decreasing function in yi, if the following inequality is verified: 
 
 '
i i i r
r
ii i i r
r
ii
i
y mt
my mt ym
m
γ γ
γ γ
 − + ⋅  − + ⋅  ≥  
 (36) 
 
Observe that for the reference family, the definition of average rate progression implies: 
 
 ( ) ( )' rr t yt y y≥   (37) 
and consequently that:  
 
  ( ) ( )' r ir i
i
t y m
t y m y
m
≥   (37’) 
Observe now that if i i rmγ γ> , then ( )i i i r iy m mγ γ− + ⋅ < i iy m . If in (37’) we substitute y in the 
argument of t( ⋅ ) and of its derivative t’( ⋅ ) with a smaller quantity, a fortiori inequality (36) is 
verified.  
For i>r,  being the r.h.s. in (29’) negative, iγ  is greater than i rm γ  
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Otherwise, if ( )i i i r iy m mγ γ− + ⋅  is greater 31 than i iy m , it is the restriction adopted on taxable 
incomes that is sufficient for (36) to be verified. This restriction works through the following 
specifications: 
 
(i) the tax system admits an exemption  er = γr  32 and  
(ii) the tax function can be expressed as: 
 
 *i i i r i i i r r
i i
y m y mt t e
m m
γ γ γ γ   − + ⋅ − + ⋅= −        (38) 
 
where the function ( )* .t  has a first derivative positive and not decreasing w.r.t. y. 
Under these assumptions, condition (36) for average rate progression becomes:  
 
  
*
'
*
i i
r
ii i
r
ii
i
yt
myt ym
m
γ
γ
 −  −  ≥  
  (39) 
 
which a fortiori holds if (37’) holds, being i i iy y γ≥ − . 
We conclude our analysis with the further consideration on the contradiction lying inside a tax 
credit, when it is preferred to a more proper exemption. 
Consider the case when the tax schedule admits for the reference family a tax credit cr. The tax 
function can now be represented as  
 
 i i i r i i i r r
i i
y m y mt t c
m m
γ γ γ γ
°
   − + ⋅ − + ⋅= −      
 (40) 
 
where the function ( ).t°  coincides with ( ).t  but for the presence of cr. Expression (36) specializes 
now into the following expression 
 
 '
i i i r
r
ii i i r
ii
i
y mt c
my mt ym
m
γ γ
γ γ °
°
 − + ⋅ −  − + ⋅  ≥  
 (41) 
 
In piecewise linear a tax system, similar to the one described in Table A4 in the Appendix, as long 
as everything lies in the firs brackets and ( ) ( )1r r i ic mα γ γ> − , we can apply the same 
considerations as when ( )r r i ie mγ γ> − . Conversely, for y →∞ , (41) becomes less than 1. 
                                                 
31 i rγ γ is smaller than im  when the subsistence scale is greater than the scale over the subsistence but the i type family 
is “smaller” than the reference one.  
32 It would be enough that r r i ie mγ γ≥ − , but in order to avoid unpleasant effects it is convenient that r re γ= : for 
instance if r re γ<  it might happen that if the coefficient mi for the i type family is augmented, the tax increases instead 
of diminishing. 
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It follows that in a piecewise linear tax scheduling where (i) marginal bracket tax rates are not 
decreasing w.r.t. income and (ii) for the reference family is admitted a basic exemption r re γ= , (33) 
is overall income inequality reducing, whatever is the reference family chosen and, consequently, is 
within type inequality reducing. Otherwise, with the same system, if the basic exemption is 
substituted by a tax credit 1r rc eα= ⋅ , (25) may not be satisfied. 
In what it concerns tax progression, it is worth to stress that the elasticity of (33) w.r.t. income is 
the same for equivalent incomes, only when the parameter i rγ γ= , are the same i∀ ; otherwise it is 
higher for families with i rγ γ> . 
3 LINES FOR A MORE FAMILY ORIENTED TAX SYSTEM IN POLAND  
In the present Polish personal tax system no family allowances are scheduled: the only 
distinction is made between singles and couples, being indifferent for the latter having or not having 
children. 
We try to introduce some corrections intended to design a more fair system: the corrections 
consists in children exemptions. In order to limit the loss in tax revenue we design a tax schedule 
with intermediate income brackets and a higher maximum marginal rate. We consider also the 
reduction in spouse coefficient.  
Together with the present tax system, we analyze two further systems: both the new  proposed 
systems deal with the same tax schedule, present the same children exemptions but differ in what it 
concerns the spouse coefficient.  
The proposed systems are, first of all, compared with the present one on the basis of nominal 
incomes and on the average rates of family type actual taxes with respect to family incomes. 
The changes in distribution of taxes and, on the other side, the loss in tax revenue induced by the 
reforms are evaluated by simulations on the data collected in 2001 by Polish Central Statistical 
Office in Household Budget Survey. 
After the analysis based on nominal incomes,  results are evaluated by the application of an 
equivalent income function which is a mixture of the minimum survival incomes and the OECD 
scale.  
Results concerning tax burdens in both original and theoretical systems are obtained by 
application of appropriate tax schedule to the incomes of the taxpayers. Such treatment enabled 
comparisons of systems, but results obtained should be treated as significant approximation. Firstly, 
the distribution of personal income tax seems not to be representative for the whole population of 
Poland. Secondly, data collected in HBS is not directly intended to enable analysis of tax burdens 
and – as a result – appropriate fiscal categories could not be unambiguously identified. 
From the whole sample, consisting of almost 32000 households, to the simulations only sub-
sample – 20430 families – has been used. Because of the character of the analysis only single 
households and married couples with no more than 3 children were taken into account33. 
 
3.1  Two suggestions  
At present, the personal income tax adopts single households as reference family type. The 
marginal tax rates are reported in Table 1. It is worth observing that the same final tax would be 
obtained if the marginal rate 19%, were applied to all incomes from zero to 37024 PLN, allowing 
for a tax credit equal to 0.19·2790 PLN. 
                                                 
33 In the next of the paper the term “family” will be used for all analyzed types of households. 
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Couples with or without children may add up their incomes and then apply the tax schedule 
reported in Table 1 to each separate half of total income: the resulting tax is doubled. Such taxation 
treats couple as if there were two singles with income equal to half of the couple’s income. 
 
Table 1. Present income tax schedule 
Income bracket [PLN] Tax rate 
0 2790 0% 
2790 37024 19% 
37024 74048 30% 
74048  40% 
Source: Polish Ministry of Finance (http://www.mf.gov.pl). 
The spouse coefficient, being equal to 2, generates two effects. A first effect consists in doubling 
the tax credit for couples (with or without children): this effect acts at any income level. A second 
effect is produced only when family income falls into a bracket superior to the lowest: if this is the 
case, the tax saving34 is generated because on taxing twice half income, and then doubling the tax 
for each half, a smaller proportion of family income (if not any at all) is subjected to higher the 
marginal rate(s) that would correspond family income y, and a greater (if not the whole) to lower 
rate(s). Of course, this mechanism generates tax savings – in comparison to the individual taxation 
of spouses – only in case of asymmetry in within-household income distribution: the splitting is 
ineffective when each spouse enjoys the same income as the other and it is maximum when one of 
the two has income zero. 
If we formalize the present tax system (labeled P) according to the notation introduced in the 
previous sections, the γ coefficients equals to zero for each family type, while the coefficient m for 
the single is ms=1 and for couples with or without children it is indifferently mi=2 (see table 2).  
The present system results to be absolutely unfair for family with children because it does not 
keep into account the costs that parents have to face for their presence. In this context the question 
arises, how to get some hints to keep into account the presence of children? 
One possible solution is to look at the minimum survival income levels for families of a given 
composition. For Poland, such income levels are published yearly by the Institute of Labor and 
Social Matters (IPiSS) for selected family types. Analyzing published data – see IPiSS (2001) – 
subsistence minimum is on average equal to 3300 PLN for each child per year– no matter, if it is 
first, second or consecutive one. This result might justify the introduction of an exemption of 
3300 PLN for each child; this exemption, if associated to the present couple splitting, would result 
in generating a tax system similar to the German one: we label this hypothesis of reform as 
Modification A (M-a).  
According to the Polish personal tax system, we take as reference type family the single. Then, if 
( )rt ⋅  is the tax function conceived for the single, remembering the form of the equivalent income 
function (28) and that of the tax function (33), for couples with children we would have, 
respectively 
( ) ( ) ( ), , 1 1 33002r i r i i r i i i iiy S y y y nchmγ γ= = + − = − ⋅  
                                                 
34 Let tr(yi) be the tax paid by the reference household at income yi and ti(yi) the tax for the taxpayer with family of 
type i, then the tax saving is simply given by:  ( ) ( ) ( )i i r i i iac y t y t y= − . 
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 ( ) 33002
2
i i
i i r
y ncht y t − ⋅ = ⋅     (42) 
where nchi is the number of children and 3300 is the exemption evaluated on the basis of minimum 
survival income. In such system parameters γi and mi take values reported in the second part of 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Family coefficients and exemptions 
 Single Couple Couple  with 1 child 
Couple with 
2 children 
Couple with 
3 children 
Couple with n 
children 
im  1 2 2 2 2 2 Present 
system (P) 
iγ  0 0 0 0 0 0 
im  1 2 2 2 2 2 Modification 
A (M-a) 
iγ  0 0 3300 6600 9900 n·3300 
im  1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 Modification 
B (M-b) 
iγ  0 1116 1116+3300 1116+6600 1116+9900 1116+n·3300 
Source: own proposals based on IPiSS (2001). 
The new tax function (42), applied to the present income brackets and associated marginal rates 
(Table 1), induces a 15.24% tax loss for the Government. To decrease loss in tax revenue spouse 
coefficient could be lowered – keeping account of some scale economies – to 1.6. In order to 
maintain the same tax saving, induced by the present tax credit in favor of spouses, there will be 
introduced an exemption equal to 40% of 2790. We label this further hypothesis of reform 
Modification B (M-b). The new values of γ and m coefficients are reported in third part of Table 2. 
The equivalent income function (28) and the tax function (33) for couples with children, now 
become: 
( ) ( ) ( ), , 1 1 1116 33001.6r i r i i r i i i iiy S y y y nchmγ γ= = + − = − − ⋅  
    ( ) 1116 33001.6
1.6
i i
i i r
y ncht y t − − ⋅ = ⋅        (43) 
In a tax schedule which allows a tax credit equal to 0.19 ⋅2790=530.10 for the single, (42) 
doubles the tax credit for families with children; (43) gives couples with children 160% of 530.10, 
but recognizes an exemption equal to 1116 to the spouse. This means that, as long as the equivalent 
income falls in the first income bracket, the spouse exemption compensates the loss in tax credit 
due to diminishing of the splitting coefficient. It smoothes the loss of tax saving in higher income 
brackets.  
For mentioned tax schedules it could be observed that 
( )( ) ( )( )1 1.6 1116 3300 1 2 3300i i i iy nch y nch− − ⋅ ≥ − ⋅  
when 2 2790iy ≥ ⋅ . If the tax is calculated on the same reference schedule (the one conceived for 
the single) and this schedule presents tax-free amount equal to 2790, it results that (43) gives tax 
values which are not lower than those implied by (42). More precisely, if equivalent incomes, being 
an argument of tax function in (42) and (43), fall in the first income bracket, the taxes calculated for 
the two schedules result to be exactly the same. Tax calculated for (43) is higher than the one 
obtained for (42), if ( )1116 3300 1.6i iy nch− − ⋅  falls in an income bracket higher than the first one. 
 
The percentage loss of tax revenue when M-b is applied together with the present tax schedule 
equals to 14.59%. The gain obtained through lowering the spouse coefficient is a bit more than a 
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half (0.65) per cent point. In order to restrict the tax loss for the Government we draft a more 
progressive tax schedule for the single, that is the reference type. The proposed tax schedule is 
reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Modified tax schedule 
Income bracket [PLN] Tax rate 
0 2790 0% 
2790 15000 19% 
15000 20000 22% 
20000 30000 26% 
30000 45000 30% 
45000 60000 33% 
60000 75000 36% 
75000 100000 40% 
100000  45% 
Source: own proposal. 
 
Applications of M-a to the new tax schedule leads to a tax loss of 11.59%, whilst for M-b the 
loss is equal to 9.60%. The difference between the two systems is a bit higher than before – nearly 2 
per cent point. This happens because a modification in a splitting coefficient is the more effective 
the higher is the progression in marginal rates.  
In the next of the paragraph we shall use the following abbreviations for the mentioned tax 
schedules: ps for the present tax schedule (Table 1) and ms for the modified tax schedule (Table 3). 
  
The average35 tax rates induced by M-a/ms and M-b/ms, together with those associated to P/ps, 
are plotted in Figure 1. With the proposed reforms, in spite of more progressive tax schedule, 
families with children face a reduction in average tax rates, at least up to a certain level of income 
and this level increases with the number of children. For couples with one child the level is 40000 
PLN (M-b/ms) and 45000 PLN (M-a/ms). It increases to 55000 PLN (M-b/ms) and to 60000 PLN 
(M-a/ms) when there are two children in the family and reaches 70000 PLN (M-b/ms) and 75000 
PLN (M-a/ms) for couples with three children. 
Above these limits, for the family with one offspring the maximum difference in average tax rate 
between M-b/ms and P/ps is 5 per cent points and it is reached at 140000 PLN; it is contained at 3 
per cent points for M-a/ms. These differences are on decrease with increase in number of children: 4 
per cent points over 140000 PLN for M-b/ms for families with two children. For families with three 
children the difference reaches 3 per cent points (M-b/ms) for incomes greater than 120000 PLN 
and is restricted to 1 per cent point (over 75000 PLN) for M-a/ms. Of course, as it is conceived, the 
reforms do not bring any tax-cuts to couples without children and to singles. Tax amounts are 
indifferent to the choice of tax schedule up to 30000 PLN for childless couples, and up to 15000 
PLN for singles. Over these limits, for singles the average rates increases up to a maximum of 4 per 
cent points, which is reached over 70000 PLN, for either modified systems. For the couple without 
children, with M-b/ms the rise reaches a maximum of 6 per cent points over 160000 PLN (4 per 
cent points over 55000 PLN), while stops at a maximum increase of 4 per cent points, over 140000 
PLN, when M-a/ms reform is chosen. 
Table 4 reports average tax rates for all families within each family type for the analyzed sample. 
 
                                                 
35 Some information on the distribution of income within analyzed sample are presented in Table 6. 
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Figure 1. Average tax rates for M-a/ms, M-b/ms and P/ps for nominal incomes. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
On average, the reform cost would equal to 0.65 per cent points for singles and 0.4 per cent 
points (M-a/ms) or 0.78 per cent points (M-b/ms) for couples. Tax-cuts would be yielded by 
families with children – the highest for a family with three children: 6.31 per cent points (M-b/ms) 
or 6.52 per cent points (M-a/ms) on average. Quite high reduction could be observed also for 
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families with two children – about 3.5 per cent points (M-b/ms) and 4 per cent points (M-a/ms). For 
families with just one offspring tax-cut would equal to 1.3 per cent points and 1.7 per cent points, 
respectively. 
 
Table 4. Average tax rates for nominal incomes 
 Single Couple Couple  with 1 child 
Couple  
with 2 children 
Couple  
with 3 children 
P/ps 14.92% 14.32% 15.03% 15.04% 14.55% 
M-a/ms 15.57% 14.77% 13.33% 11.00%  8.03% 
M-b/ms 15.57% 15.10% 13.74% 11.33%  8.24% 
P/ps: present system with present tax schedule; M-a/ms: modified (a) system with the more progressive tax schedule; 
M-b/ms: modified (b) system with the more progressive tax schedule. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
 
3.2   Evaluations of the proposed reforms 
In the previous section we based our considerations on nominal incomes. In this section we 
analyze the performance of the present tax systems and the ones of the proposed reforms, on the 
basis of equivalent incomes. 
The transformation of nominal incomes into equivalent incomes cannot be carried on 
unambiguously, as it depends on the choice of equivalence function that is judged to be the “true” 
one. Nominal incomes themselves may be considered as equivalent, if one accepts a transformation 
function which assumes everywhere the constant value 1. 
Because of the type of the analysis performed, we decided to employ officially used statistics to 
construct function of equivalent incomes. Legal character of tax system requires defining possibly 
general rules and stable sources of data.  
In Polish official statistics there are used two equivalent scales – the OECD scale and the 
modified OECD scale. The former one assigns 1 for first adult, 0.7 for consecutive adults and 0.5 
for each child. In the latter these values are equal to 1, 0.5 and 0.3 respectively. The modified scale, 
widely accepted in European official statistics, is said to become more appropriate with increase of 
the wealth and is going to completely replace the original scale in Polish official statistics. 
Additionally, tax systems obtained using the modified scale are less costly for the Government. For 
these reasons in following analyses modified OECD scale will be employed. 
On the side of exemptions, mentioned earlier subsistence minimum levels for Poland – see IPiSS 
(2001) – will be applied. Values of parameters mi and γi based on this sources are presented in 
Table 5. These coefficients and exemptions, together with the more progressive tax schedule 
(Table 3) will constitute our benchmark tax system. 
Table 5. Family coefficients and exemptions for the benchmark transformation function 
 Single Couple Couple  with 1 child 
Couple  
with 2 children 
Couple  
with 3 children 
Couple  
with n children 
OECD scale 
coefficients im  1 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 1.5 + n·0.3 
Minimum 
survival 
incomes 
iγ  4000 6700 10000 13300 16600 6700 + n·3300 
Source: own proposal based on IPiSS (2001) and information from Polish Central Statistical Office. 
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Values adopted in the present tax system in Poland are lower than values resulting from 
published data on subsistence minimum. Minimum income for the single amounts to 4000 PLN, 
which is much greater than the present no tax limit of 2790. Analogously, for the couple a value of 
6700 PLN is also greater than twice 2790. So a tax credit of 0.19·2790 for a single, and of 
2·0.19·2790, and even more if it is 1.6·0.19·2790 appears as inadequate if compared with an 
exemption of 4000 PLN for the single, and of 6700 PLN for a couple. 
If we adopt the coefficients reported in Table 5 with the present tax schedule, substituting the 
present tax credit with the new exemptions for the adults, that is 4000 PLN for each single and 
6700 PLN for each couple, the loss for the tax revenue would amount to the 21.57%; if applied to 
the more progressive tax schedule, given in Table 3, the loss would be 18.67%. 
Of course: demographic or social reasons, together with budget restrictions, can interact with the 
economic theory hints and produce a final scale which may differ substantially from theoretical one. 
So we do not pretend that here adopted benchmark generates an actual scale for taxation. However, 
it constitutes a useful device that can help in analyzing the fairness of a tax system. 
General characteristics of the sample that was used in evaluations of proposed tax reforms is 
presented in Table 6. Analyzing average income of given family types it could be observed that in 
terms of nominal values, income of couples with or without children is quite similar. This situation 
significantly changes, when equivalent values are taken into account: income of couples with three 
children is almost three times lower in comparison with childless couples. 
 
Table 6. Basic statistics for nominal and equivalent income 
 
Single Couple Couple  
with 1 child 
Couple  
with 2 children 
Couple  
with 3 children
Nominal income 
Mean 11232 21745 24552 24111 20752 
Standard deviation 9063 12833 16895 17119 16185 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 240000 222600 216000 240000 168670 
Percentage of positives 95 99 97 96 92 
Percentage of zeros 5 1 3 4 8 
Percentage of negatives 0 0 0 0 0 
Equivalent income 
Mean 11232 14030 12085 9148 5730 
Standard deviation 9063 7884 9386 8152 6744 
Minimum 0 -467 -1556 -2333 -2917 
Maximum 240000 147933 118444 111952 67362 
Percentage of positives 95 99 97 94 86 
Percentage of zeros 5 0 0 0 0 
Percentage of negatives 0 1 3 6 14 
Source: own calculations. 
Relatively the worst situation of couples with two and three children is confirmed by percentages 
of families gaining income equal to zero (in terms of nominal values) or lower than zero (in terms 
of equivalent income). Both statistics take the highest values for couples with 3 children: 8% of 
such families gains no income (subjecting to personal income tax) and income of further 6% of 
these families is so low that its equivalent value is lower than zero. 
Presented results, together with moderate values of standard deviation, suggest underprivileged 
position of families with more than one child – in comparison to others – in the context of income 
taxation.  
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This conclusion is confirmed by the average tax rates. In Table 7 average tax rates with respect 
to equivalent incomes are given. In terms of equivalent incomes, on average, the cost for the couple 
is roughly the same as in terms of nominal incomes (for the single it is the same by definition of 
equivalent income) – see Table 4. Tax savings resulting from modified systems are easily seen for 
families with children. In terms of equivalent incomes they are even higher than in terms of nominal 
ones. From the table it also results that with the present system families with children are taxed with 
an average rate which reaches almost 22%. 
Table 7. Average tax rates for equivalent incomes 
 Single Couple Couple  with 1 child 
Couple  
with 2 children 
Couple  
with 3 children 
P/ps 14.92% 14.80% 16.97% 18.87% 21.95% 
M-a/ms 15.57% 15.26% 15.05% 13.81% 12.12% 
M-b/ms 15.57% 15.60% 15.51% 14.22% 12.44% 
Benchmark 13.37% 14.41% 14.05% 12.64% 10.86% 
P/ps: present system with present tax schedule; M-a/ms: modified (a) system with the more severe tax schedule; 
M-b/ms: modified (b) system with the more progressive tax schedule. Benchmark is the system adopting coefficients 
and exemptions given in Table 5, with the more progressive tax schedule. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
 
In the last row of the table there are given average rates, in equivalent terms, that would yield the 
benchmark system. It appears that, on average, the reforms present average rates still above the 
benchmark values. For families with children differences from the benchmark system range from 1 
per cent point to 1.60 per cent points, according to the family type and the hypothesis of reform. 
Even more contained are differences for the couple. Slightly bigger is the difference for the single – 
2 per cent points; this is due to the fact that the present tax credit is lower than the minimum 
survival income, reported in Table 5.  
 
Figure 2 presents differences – in terms of nominal values – between the average tax rates for the 
benchmark system, the present one and the two hypotheses of reform. The present systems, shows 
the highest distances from the benchmark especially at lower incomes and the unfairness is greater 
the more numerous children are: the maximum difference is 3 per cent points for the couple without 
children and 5 per cent points for a single, it jumps above 8 per cent points when there is a child and 
yields 12 per cent points with three children. As incomes grow, the unfairness decrease and the 
present systems may become more advantageous than the benchmark. For the single this happens at 
25000 PLN, for the couple without children at 35000 PLN, for the couple with one child at 
55000 PLN, at 70000 PLN for the couple with two children and never – in the considered interval – 
for the couple with three children, even if the benchmark has a more progressive tax schedule. 
It is then evident how the reforms correct an inequity which is very strong at lower income 
levels. Actually, if the reform were applied, all considered family types should be taxed more than 
at present, at higher income levels; the point where the present situation switches to be better than 
the proposed reforms, is higher the more numerous a family is: 15000 PLN for the single, 30000 
PLN for the couple, nearly at 50000 PLN with one child, about at 65000 PLN with two children and 
75000 PLN for the couple with three children. 
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Figure 2. Differences in tax rates between M-a/ms, M-b/ms and P/ps and the benchmark system 
(for nominal incomes). 
Source: own calculations. 
 
In what it concerns the relationship of the reforms with the benchmark, we see that M-b/ms has 
average tax rates always greater than the latter. M-a/ms has always greater average tax rates than the 
benchmark for all family types36 except for the couple without children and the couple with one 
                                                 
36 Actually for the single M-a/ms and M-b/ms coincide. 
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child: in the former case the line of M-a/ms crosses the income axis at 11000 PLN and in the latter 
at 150000 PLN, in any case much after than the present system does. 
 It is due to the lack of a suitable no tax area that makes the present tax rates so high – in relation 
to the benchmark – at lower incomes. 
Summarizing, starting from the present tax system, it would be desired to improve situation of 
those, whose actual situations is relatively the worst, that is families with children. However, 
reformed systems proposed in the paper, do not make worse the present situation – at low level of 
income – either for the single or for the couple without children.  
 
 
Table 8 presents Gini concentration, redistribution and progressivity indexes  within each family 
type; analogous indexes for the whole sample can be found in Table 9. Indexes have been 
calculated on equivalent incomes: 
(i) adding to each equivalent income the maximum value of absolute negative value which 
resulted to be 2916.67, in order to get rid of negative values and then  
(ii) weighting each income by the mi coefficient, reported in Table 5.  
The shift introduced in the procedure leads to the same effect that would be generated if nominal 
incomes were transformed into equivalent ones, taking as reference type the couple with three 
children instead of the single37.  
Due to the higher progression of the modified schedule, the modified systems are more 
inequality reducing than the original one. Moreover, M-b/ms reduces inequality stronger than 
M-a/ms due to a lower coefficient for spouses, which is decreased from 2 to 1.6. 
 
 
Table 8. Within family types Gini indexes for equivalent incomes  
before and after taxation. Redistribution and progressivity indexes 
 Single Couple Couple  with 1 child 
Couple  
with 2 children 
Couple  
with 3 children 
Equivalent incomes before taxation 
1  0.2576 0.2378 0.3123 0.3331 0.3835 
Equivalent incomes after taxation 
2 P/ps 0.2355 0.2192 0.2926 0.3148 0.3659 
3 M-a/ms 0.2314 0.2161 0.2833 0.3028 0.3545 
4 M-b/ms 0.2314 0.2140 0.2809 0.3008 0.3531 
Equivalent taxes 
5 P/ps 0.4221 0.3706 0.4362 0.4424 0.4869 
6 M-a/ms 0.4435 0.3879 0.5221 0.5915 0.7155 
7 M-b/ms 0.4435 0.3983 0.5318 0.6000 0.7214 
Redistribution indexes (Reynolds-Smolensky)* 
8 (1)-(2) 0.0221 0.0186 0.0197 0.0183 0.0176 
9 (1)-(3) 0.0262 0.0217 0.0290 0.0303 0.0290 
10 (1)-(4) 0.0262 0.0238 0.0314 0.0323 0.0304 
Progressivity indexes (Kakwani)* 
11 (5)-(1) 0.1645 0.1328 0.1239 0.1093 0.1035 
12 (6)-(1) 0.1859 0.1501 0.2098 0.2584 0.3320 
13 (7)-(1) 0.1859 0.1605 0.2195 0.2669 0.3379 
* For definition of both indexes and detailed discussion see for example Lambert (2001). 
Source: own calculations. 
                                                 
37 Amount 2916.67 is exactly equal to 4000-(1/2.4)⋅16600. For an alternative procedures see Chau-Nan Chen et al. 
(1982).  
 30
 
Table 9. Overall concentration indexes for equivalent  
incomes and taxes, before and after taxation order. Redistribution and progressivity indexes 
A B C D E F  
Incomes 
(proper order) 
Overall 
Incomes 
(before tax 
order) 
Overall 
Taxes 
(proper order) 
Overall 
Taxes 
(before tax order) 
Overall 
Overall 
redistribution 
(Reynolds- 
Smolensky) 
index 
Overall 
progressivity 
(Kakwani) 
index 
Before tax 
1  0.3120 0.3120     
After tax 
2 P/ps 0.2956 0.2954 0.4299 0.4219 0.0166 * 0.1099 ° 
3 M-a/ms 0.2843 0.2843 0.5230 0.5226 0.0277 ** 0.2106 °° 
4 M-b/ms 0.2825 0.2825 0.5308 0.5305 0.0295 ***  0.2185 °°° 
* B1-B2. ** B1-B3. *** B1-B4.  
° D2-B1. °° D3-B1. °°° D4-B1. 
Source: own calculations. 
In what it concerns the within analysis, the income order before and after taxation is the same as 
it is expected due to the properties of (42) and (43), applied to progressive tax schedule. Thus, all 
concentration indexes presented in Table 8 are Gini coefficients. 
Tax systems (42) and (43) preserve original ranking (ranking of incomes before taxation) in after 
tax incomes – in case of analysis made within given family type. The same, however, may not be 
true in case of between group analysis, where the equivalent income transformation – used for 
overall evaluation – is not the same as those used to obtain the tax function.  
Results shown in Table 9 indicate that indexes calculated on the proper order (appearing after 
taxation) are different from those calculated keeping the order existing before taxation. In fact, 
concentration of taxes, measured by Gini coefficients (with proper order, column D) is 
systematically greater than measured by correspondent concentration indexes (ordered as if it was 
income before taxation, column C; these concentration indexes are – despite the same formula – no 
longer Gini coefficients). These differences are relatively stronger for the present system then for 
the reformed ones – they indicate level of vertical inequity. 
Analyzing columns A and B, we see that for the proposed reformed systems, indexes are 
practically the same – there are very small differences, which disappear in approximating. For the 
present systems we observe a difference, which indicate extent of re-ranking – different values of 
mentioned indexes prove that tax system violates axiom of maximal progression (see Kakwani, 
Lambert, 1998). It means that vertical inequality (indicated by differences between values in 
columns C and D) is so significant that caused changes in the ranking of incomes before and after 
taxation. 
This would indicate that present system is unfair not only because it does not keep into account 
the presence of children, but even generates somewhere an unfair ordering in what it concerns 
disposable incomes after taxation. This unfair results are present also in the reformed systems, but 
their extent is even much more contained, especially for the case of exact splitting between spouses. 
Both proposed reforms result in significant increase in progressivity. Such change – observed for 
all analyzed family types – is a result of modifications of both tax rates and the structure of the tax 
system. Also redistributive properties of proposed reforms are improved (in comparison to the 
present system). In case of bigger families percentage of income, distributed from higher- to lower-
income taxpayers (measured by Reynolds-Smolensky’s indexes) is almost doubled. 
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Additional information on the structure of changes induced by proposed tax reforms could be get 
through decomposition of obtained Gini indexes. It is well known that the Gini index cannot 
generally be decomposed into a between-family-types part and a within-family-types part. 
However, there are presented in literature some proposals of decomposition that generally come 
down to the following form (Dagum, 1997; cf. Aronson, Johnson, Lambert, 1994): 
 
 B W tG G G G= + +   (44) 
 
where 
GB is the index that would result if each family within a specific type were given the average 
income of its own type (between-family-type part);  
W i i i
i
G p q G= ∑ , where Gi is the Gini index for the specific family type i (i=1,2,3,4,5; see Table 8), 
pi is the share all equivalent people in family type i (i=1,2,3,4,5) with respect to all equivalent 
people in the sample, qi is the share of overall equivalent income possessed by all people in family 
type i (i=1,2,3,4,5); 
Gt is the transvariation coefficient. It is the difference between the Gini index in the left hand side of 
equation (44) and the concentration index C that results when ranking all incomes according to the 
ranking of family type average incomes38. The decompositions for Gini indexes are reported in 
Table 10.  In the same table, below the values of indexes, there is the ratio of each of the three 
components of the index, with respect to the global index. 
 
Table 10. Gini indexes decomposition  
 G GB GW Gt 
Before tax 0.3121 0.1021 0.0649 0.1450 
Before tax (relative) 1 0.3272 0.2080 0.4648 
 
After P/ps tax 0.2956 0.1066 0.0605 0.1286 
After P/ps  (relative) 1 0.3604 0.2047 0.4349 
 
After M-a/ms tax 0.2843 0.0951 0.0590 0.1302 
After M-a/ms (relative) 1 0.3346 0.2076 0.4578 
 
After M-b/ms tax 0.2825 0.0950 0.0586 0.1290 
After M-b/ms (relative) 1 0.3362 0.2073 0.4565 
Source: own calculations. 
 
From Table 10 it appears that the greatest changes in the relative composition of Gini index is 
shown by the present tax system, much more contained are the relative changes induced by the two 
proposed tax reforms. For the present tax system GB/G rises from 32.72% to 36.04%, while for  M-
a/ms and M-b/ms the ratio shifts, respectively, to 33.46% and 33.62%, that is less than one per cent 
point. Rather stable is the ratio for GW/G. The ratio Gt/G is in some way complementary to GB/G. 
Given that the marginal tax rates progression for M-a/ms  and M-b/ms  is much stronger than for 
                                                 
38 Firsty, incomes are ordered by family type, taking into account average income for every family type. Secondly they 
are ordered – within each type – by amounts of income.  
In the case here considered, we see from the second part of Table 6 that the ranking for average incomes, from the 
lowest to the highest, is: couples with 3 children, couples with 2 children, singles, couples with 1 child and couples 
without children. In the particular case when all the incomes of each specific family type do not overlap with incomes 
of other type – if the richest equivalent person in the group of couples with 3 children were less rich then the poorest in 
the group of couples with 2 children and so on – Gt would be equal to zero.  
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P/ps, the sensible alteration for GB/G induced by the present tax system, indicates how this system 
biases horizontal equity, given the adopted benchmark scale.  
 
Deeper insight into structure of the relative changes, resulting from the changes in tax system, 
could be given by application of further decomposition of Gini indexes. According to results 
obtained by Dagum (1997)39, if we order the H=5 family types such that their average incomes µj 
(i=1,2,3,4,5) are in a decreasing order, that is µ1≥  µ2 ≥  µ3 ≥  µ4 ≥  µ5, we can express the term GB, 
which appears in formula (44), as 
 
 , , , ,
1
1j hH HH H
B l j m h l j m h jhH H
j h j l m
g g g
g g
G n n y y D
nµ µ= +
      = − ⋅ ⋅  ⋅ ⋅    
∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ ∑
  (45) 
and the   term Gw as  
 ( ), , , ,
1
1 1
j hH HH H
t l j m h l j m h jhH H
j h j l m
g g g
g g
G n n y y D
n n µ= +
      = − ⋅ ⋅ −  ⋅ ⋅    
∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ ∑
  (45’) 
in (45) and (45’)  Hj represents  the number of families in the jth group  (j=1,2,3,4,5) and the term 
Djh is defined as  
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  (46) 
 
In expressions (45), (45’) and (46) indexes j and h refers to two different family types 
(j=1,2,3,4,5 and h=j+1,..5): µj≥ µh.  nl,j is the equivalent number of components of family l which is 
of type j, and, conversely,  nm,h is the equivalent number of components of family m which is of 
type h. In the denominator of (46) there are added all the weighted absolute differences between 
equivalent incomes of the two different types, taken into considerations. The numerator reports the 
same differences with their relative signs: provided that the average of type j is greater then the 
average of type h, the numerator is positive. If all incomes in j are greater than incomes in h, Djh is 
1; Djh becomes zero if the two averages are equal. 
Dagum observes that Djh can be interpreted as a directional economic distance  ratio or a relative 
economic affluence (REA) measure.   
We stress that Djh (that is REAs  between the j and h family types) is a factor either of GB or of 
Gt. 
Table 11 reports REAs for the considered family types. The tables ranks the family types 
according to the  average (equivalent) incomes (in decreasing order). Each line in the table indicates 
                                                 
39 Formulae (45), (45’) and (46) are a bit different from those presented by Dagum (1997): there  the ranking for 
average incomes is reversed w.r.t. the one adopted in the present article, that is µ1≤  µ2≤  µ3≤  …, moreover in (45), 
(45’) and (46) the differences are weighted by ni,j  (i=1,2,..,Hj; j=1,2,3,4,5) and ng (i=1,2,3,4,5) that may be not integer 
and, last, (45) and (45’) are obtained from Dagum‘s (35) and (36) after some simplifications of redundant terms. 
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how affluent is the group of families to which the line refers, with respect to the group marked at 
the head of a column. For instance, before taxation, the Relative Economic Affluence of the 
childless couples ranges from a relative advantage of 21.69% (with respect to the couples with 1 
child), to 80.39% (when compared to couples with 3 children). Before taxation the  REA of singles 
is 26.28% w.r.t. couples with 2 children and it is 65.63% when compared to couples with 
3 children. 
Table 11 shows that all tax systems preserve the average equivalent incomes ranking which 
existed before taxation40. 
The present tax system is the one which mostly changes REA values existing before taxation; it 
results to be strongly favourable first of all for couples and singles. With just one exception, all 
positive variations are greater than 2.3 per cent points, with a maximum of 6.46, and favour families 
with less children with respect to families with more children41.  
 
Table 11. Relative economic affluence (REA) effects  and REA variations due to taxation 
 
 
 C+1 
REA 
C+1 
Tax 
∆REA ⋅ 100 
S 
REA 
S 
Tax 
∆REA ⋅ 100 
C+2 
REA 
C+2 
Tax 
∆REA ⋅ 100 
C+3 
REA 
C+3 
Tax 
∆REA ⋅ 100 
Before tax 
P/ps 
M-a/ms tax 
M-b/ms tax 
C 0.2169 
0.2619 
0.2274 
0.2314 
 
4.50 
1.05 
1.45 
0.3469 
0.3665 
0.3750 
0.3702 
 
1.97 
2.81 
2.33 
0.5359 
0.5943 
0.5467 
0.5508 
 
5.83 
1.08 
1.49 
0.8039 
0.8414 
0.8111 
0.8137 
 
3.74 
0.75 
0.97 
Before tax 
P/ps 
M-a/ms tax 
M-b/ms tax 
C+1   0.1011 
0.0703 
0.1169 
0.1093 
 
-3.08 
1.58 
0.82 
0.3263 
0.3560 
0.3286 
0.3298 
 
2.97 
0.23 
0.35 
0.6668 
0.7005 
0.6697 
0.6707 
 
3.37 
0.29 
0.39 
Before tax 
P/ps 
M-a/ms tax 
M-b/ms tax 
S     0.2628 
0.3274 
0.2523 
0.2596 
 
6.46 
-1.05 
-0.32 
0.6532 
0.7083 
0.6503 
0.6545 
 
5.51 
-0.29 
0.13 
Before tax 
P/ps 
M-a/ms tax 
M-b/ms tax 
C+2       0.4359 
0.4591 
0.4375 
0.4380 
 
2.32 
0.16 
0.21 
Source: own calculations. 
Table 12. Head count ratio 
 Single Couple Couple with 1 child 
Couple 
with 2 children 
Couple 
with 3 children 
Before Taxation 
 6,68% 4,24% 13,46% 23,99% 42,89% 
After taxation 
P/ps 7,09% 4,52% 16,14% 29,34% 51,90% 
M-a/ms 7,09% 4,52% 14,26% 24,64% 44,37% 
M-b/ms 7,09% 4,52% 14,26% 24,64% 44,37% 
Source: own calculations. 
 
                                                 
40 The REAs ranking and the average incomes ranking must be necessarily the same. 
41 Generally, it significantly increases differences in relative affluence between family types. The only exception is 
relative affluence of couples with 1 child and singles, which is diminished by this system by 3.08 per cent points (but 
this reduction means improvement in situation of singles). 
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Definitely  the two proposed reforms are much more family oriented: the only variations which 
are greater than 2 per cent points are registered between couples and singles. Singles shows a 
negative variation when compared with the couple with 2 children, either for M-a/ms or M-b/ms, 
and with couples with 3 children, for M-a/ms. Even if differences are quite contained, if we look at 
variations in REAs, M-a/ms shows to be a bit more family friendly than M-b/ms.The role of 
exemptions is additionally enlightened by values of head count ratio, presented in Table 12. This 
ratios describe percentage of families of a given type that get income lower than the minimum 
survival one (see Table 5). 
Despite the more progressive tax schedule, applied in both proposed reforms, introducing 
exemptions for children enabled to significantly reduce impact of taxation on the percentage of 
families with children, for whom after tax income lies below the minimum survival line. As a result, 
in case of both reform proposals, percentage of such families is only slightly higher than for income 
before taxation. It seems to be more coherent with assumption that such low incomes should not be 
taxed at all. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we analyzed some properties and the behavior of a family of affine income 
equivalent function in what it concerns inequality reduction and the pursuing of horizontal equitable 
tax systems. We chose this function because it allows to introduce the specification – independently 
for each family type – both of a lump sum and of family coefficients which transforms taxable 
incomes into equivalent incomes, with respect to a reference family. 
In section 2 we found out the restrictions on the income domain and on the tax schedule that 
allow the adopted transformation function to be overall inequality reducing whatever the reference 
family is. 
 To the paper, there is attached an appendix intended to throw more lights on the 
relations existing among the traditional instruments for family charges: tax credit, exemption and 
family quotient.  
In the empirical part we considered the problem of  reforming the Polish personal income 
tax system, which, at present, does not allow for any exemption, quotient or tax credit for the 
presence of children in general. The core of our suggested reform hypotheses laid in two 
specifications of the equivalent transformation function analyzed in the second paragraph: these 
specifications adopted a spouse coefficient – different for two proposals – and children exemptions. 
Both proposed functions were based on benchmark equivalent income function which belonged to 
the same family. This benchmark function, specified on the basis of the minimum survival income 
and the OECD scale was further used for assessment of an equivalent income and changes in its 
distribution.  
We verified that the proposed functions would yield a less unequal tax system, both in 
vertical and in horizontal sense. The results obtained through the analysis of the average tax rates 
curves and simulations conducted on a sample encompassing families of selected type – singles, 
childless couples and couples with no more than three children – showed that the proposed reforms 
would sensibly improve the situation of families with children, both in sense of nominal and 
equivalent incomes.  
 Pragmatic reasons, together with results obtained from analysis of average tax rates 
and simulations performed, would suggest to maintain the present spouse coefficient (splitting into 
to equal parts) at least when children are present. A spouse coefficient lower than 2 might be taken 
into consideration for spouses without children. In any case spouses should be allowed to decide 
either for a joint or a separate personal income tax, but impact of possibility of such a decision was 
not analyzed in the present version of the paper.  
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APPENDIX 
SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ANALYTICAL RELATIONS  
AMONG QUOTIENT, EXEMPTION AND TAX CREDIT 
 
A tax system can be evaluated in what it concerns its capability to keep into account family 
burdens just looking at the amount of tax saving or to the number of explicit or implicit shares into 
which it splits family incomes or to income amounts which are (explicitly or implicitly) deduced 
from taxable income, due to the presence of family burdens. In this appendix we take into 
consideration tax credit ci, exemption ei and family quotient qi, when invariant w.r.t income and 
depending only on family characteristics. In particular we analyze the effects that a tax credit ci, an 
exemption ei and a family quotient qi, have on the taxation for a family type i, under the aspect of 
tax saving, not taxable income and virtual number of family shares into which the tax payer income 
yi is divided. 
(a) The tax saving can be immediately calculated: it is the difference between the tax due by a 
reference tax payer r, generally without family burdens, and the tax due by another tax payer i with 
the same income yi as r, but with family burdens. Let tr(yi) be r‘s tax and ti(yi) the tax for the one 
with family burdens of type i: then the tax saving is simply given by: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )i i r i i iac y t y t y= −   (A1) 
 
(b)  In order to evaluate the not taxable income, we have to determine the income t ry  for which 
the reference subject r must pay a tax ( )r t rt y equal to the same tax ( )i it y which is due by the 
subject with family burdens and income yi. Once t ry  has been detected, the income amount not 
taxable for the presence of family burdens is: 
 
 ( )i i i t rae y y y= −     where t ry  s.t. ( ) ( )i i r t rt y t y=   (A2) 
 
(c)  For the virtual number of family shares we have to find n ry  at which r faces the same 
average tax rate as the tax payer with family burdens. The virtual number of shares into which is 
divided the income yi of the latter is given by the ratio: 
 
 ( )i i i n raq y y y=      s.t.  ( ) ( )i i i r n r n rt y y t y y=         (A3) 
 
On substituting n ry  by ( )n r i i iy y aq y=  into the equation which imposes the two average tax 
rates to be equal, we get ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )i i i r i i i i i it y y t y aq y y aq y =      and then 
( ) ( ) ( )( )i i i i r i i it y aq y t y aq y= ⋅ , from which we get that the tax due by the tax payer with family 
burdens can be interpreted as the result of a taxation applied to aqi(yi) independent subjects each 
having an income equal to ( )n r i i iy y aq y= . 
 
 
Notice that n ry < t ry : for, in correspondence of t ry , generally we have: 
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  ( ) ( ) ( )r n r i i r t r
n r i t r
t y t y t y
y y y
= <   (A4) 
 
because, according to (A2), ( ) ( )i i r t rt y t y= , while, if the fiscal law adopts any horizontal equity 
instrument, i t ry y> . If the average tax rate is increasing w.r.t. income42, when n r t ry y>  inequality 
(A4) can but increase: then if a solution exists this must happen for  
 
 n r t ry y<   (A5) 
 
We shall now take into consideration either the case when the marginal tax rate is constant or the 
case when it is increasing w.r.t income; we moreover assume that there is a positive income under 
which no tax is due or, in case, the is a negative income tax. In the former case the tax for the 
reference family i, is given by equation ( )r r rt y yα β= −  (β positive). Parameter β determines the 
level of no tax area and causes the average tax rate to increase w.r.t. income, even if the marginal 
tax rate is constant. In the latter case, for the sake of simplicity, we assume the marginal tax is 
continuously first differentiable. We assume there is one income earner in the family. 
Table A1 reports no tax area levels when applying each of the three instruments and for each of 
the two tax functions; ci, ei and qi are determined in such a way the no tax area level y0,i is always 
the same, given family typology i, independently from the equity instrument adopted43: this is a 
necessary assumption in order to make meaningful comparison among instruments. 
 
Table A1. Levels for the no tax area  
 
No tax area limit 
 
Tax function Reference subject 
Family i 
tax credit 
( )i i i it y y cα β= − −  
Family i 
exemption 
( )( )i i i it y y eα β= − −  
Family i 
quotient 
( )( )i i i i it y q y qα β = −   
 
( )r r rt y yα β= −  
 
 
β/α 
 
 
(β+ci)/α 
 
 
(β/α)+ei 
 
 
qi ·(β/α) 
 
Marginal tax rate 
increasing w.r.t. 
income 
y0 t-1(ci) y0+ei qi ·y0 
Source: own calculations. 
 
 
Table A2 summarizes the effects of the three instruments according to the three evaluation 
principles described in the previous paragraph when tax is ( )r r rt y yα β= − . It is easily seen that 
with this taxation function the result never depends on income, whatever the instruments is. 
Moreover, as it is easily seen, the effect is always the same provided that ci, ei and qi are chosen in 
                                                 
42 If for the reference tax payer, the one without family burdens, the average tax rate is constant, if any horizontal equity 
instrument is adopted, (A3) has no solution either for the exemption or the tax credit, moreover it is undetermined with 
the quotient. 
43 If β were equal 0, there would not be any exempt income with the quotient. 
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order to generate the same level for the no tax area: once one out of these three parameters has been 
given a value, the remaining two can be obtained univocally from the one previously fixed44.  
When the marginal tax rate is increasing w.r.t. income, the situation is more complicated. The 
effects given by the three instruments are summarized in Table A3. 
 
Table A2. tr(yr)=α·yr-β: effects generated by tax credit, exemption and quotient  
 
 Tax credit 
ti(yi)=α·y-β-ci 
Exemption 
ti(yi)=α·(y-ei)-β 
Quotient 
ti(yi)= qi·[α·( yi/qi)-β] 
 
(i) aci(yi)= tr(yi)-ti(yi) 
 
aci =ci aci =α· ei aci = (qi -1)·β 
(ii) aei(yi) = yi - t yr 
with ti (yi) = tr(t yr) 
aei = ci /α aei = ei aei =[( qi -1)·β]/α 
(iii) aq i(yi)= yi / n yr 
with ti(yi)/yi = tr(nyr)/nyr 
aqi=1+( ci /β) aqi=1+(α· ei /β) aqi = qi 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Table A3. Marginal tax rate increasing w.r.t. income: effects generated by tax credit, 
exemption and quotient (income levels above the no tax area) 
 Tax credit 
ti(yi)= tr(yi)- ci 
Exemption 
ti(yi)= tr(yi-ei) 
Quotient 
ti(yi)= qi· tr(yi/qi) 
 
(i) aci(yi)= tr(yi)-ti(yi) 
 
aci = ci 
constant 
aci(yi) = tr(yi)- tr(yi -ei) 
increasing w.r.t. yi 
aci(yi) = tr(yi)- qi· tr(yi/qi) 
increasing w.r.t. yi 
aci(yi) quotient> aci(yi) exemption 
(ii) aei(yi) = yi - t yr 
with ti (yi) = tr (t yr) 
aei(yi)= yi -tr-1[tr(yi)- ci]< ei 
decreasing w.r.t. yi 
aei =ei 
constant 
aei(yi) = yi - tr-1[qi· tr(yi/qi)]> ei 
increasing w.r.t. yi 
(iii) aq i(yi)= yi / n yr 
with ti(yi)/yi = tr (nyr)/nyr 
aq i(yi) ·tr(yi/ aq i(yi))= 
= tr(yi)- ci 
decreasing w.r.t yi 
aq i(yi) ·tr(yi/ aq i(yi))= 
=tr(yi -ei) 
decreasing w.r.t yi 
aq i(yi) exemption > 
aq i(yi) tax credit 
aqi =qi 
constant 
Source: own calculations. 
 
According to their definitions the exemption gives constant tax savings, the tax credit has 
constant no table income and the quotient presents always the same number of shares, once is given 
                                                 
44 E.g., given qi, we get the same values in each of the three rows in the table if ci=(qi-1)·β and ei =[(qi-1)·β]/α. It should 
be stressed that when tax is exactly proportional to y, and β = 0, tax credit and exemption are still each other univocally 
linked, but for quotient tax saving (and the no tax area as well) is zero. 
 
 39
the family typology. Outside these specific criteria, the three instruments show effects depending on 
income.  
Marginal tax rate increasing w.r.t. income:(i) tax saving  
Tax saving is constant by construction with tax credit, is increasing w.r.t. income when applying 
either exemption or quotient; moreover, for y above the no tax area, tax saving induced by the 
quotient is higher than that generated by the exemption, which, in turn, is greater than ci. 
Tax saving with exemption is aci(yi) =tr(yi)-tr(yi- ei): the first derivative of aci(yi) w.r.t. y is 
positive, because the marginal tax rate at yi is higher than at (yi- ei). 
With the quotient aci(yi) =tr(yi)-qi·t(yi/qi), and the first derivative of aci(yi) w.r.t. y is ( ) ( ) ( )' ' 'i i r i r i iac y =t y - t y q >0, because the marginal tax rate is increasing w.r.t. y. 
Consider  
aci(yi) quotient- aci(yi)exemption= tr(yi- ei)-qi·tr(yi/qi) 
 
if we define yi from the no tax area level for the specific family typology, we have 
yi=(y0+ei)+∆yi=qi·y0+∆yi, so the difference between the above tax savings can be written as 
 aci(yi) quotient- aci(yi)exemption = tr(y0+∆yi)- qi·tr(y0+∆yi/qi) (A6) 
the first derivative of (A6) w.r.t ∆y, tr’(y0+∆y)-tr’(y0+∆y/mh), is positive, because the marginal tax 
rate is increasing; moreover (A6) is zero when ∆yi=0, because at y0 tax is zero whatever the equity 
instrument is, then, for ∆yi>0 (A6) can be but positive. 
In what it concerns elasticity w.r.t. income of tax credit effect of exemption and quotient, we can 
observe that the former is greater than 1, when 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' 'r i i r i i i r i r i it y y t y e y t y t y e⋅ − − ⋅ > − −  (A7) 
that is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' 'r i r i ir i r i i
i i
t y t y e
t y t y e
y y
−− > − −  (A7’) 
According to (A7’), the elasticity of exemption tax credit effect is grater than 1, when the difference 
between the marginal and the average tax rate is greater before the application of the exemption 
than that which results after the application of the exemption. 
For the elasticity of quotient tax credit effect to be grater than 1, it must be verified that 
 ( ) ( )' ' i ir i i r i r i i r
i i
y yt y y t y t y q t
q q
   ⋅ − ⋅ > − ⋅      
 (A8) 
or, which is the same, comparing differences between marginal tax rates and average tax rates  
 
( ) ( ) ( )' ' r i r i iir i r
i i i i
t y t y qyt y t
q y y q
 − > −     (A8’) 
which means that the elasticity of quotient tax credit effect is greater than 1, when the difference 
between the marginal tax rate at yi and that at yi/qi is greater than the difference between the average 
tax rates calculated at the same income levels.  
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Marginal tax rate increasing w.r.t. income: (ii) non taxable income 
Non taxable income, for family burdens, decreases with constant tax credit, is constant with 
exemption and increases with quotient. 
On indicating by w=t-1(g) the inverse function of g=t(w), with tax credit first derivative of non 
taxable income w.r.t y, is negative 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
' '
'
11 1 0r i ii i r i r i
i r t rr i i
t t y cae y
t y t y
y t yt y c
−∂ − ∂  = − ⋅ = − ⋅ <∂ ∂ −  
 
 
because45 ( ) ( )' 'r t r r it y t y< , as the former is the marginal tax rate at a value lower than yi. 
In what it concerns the quotient, remembering its definition, non taxable income is 
( )1i i t r i r i r i iae y y y t q t y q−= − = − ⋅   . Partial differentiation w.r.t. y gives 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
' '
'
11 1 1 0r i r i i r i r i ii r i i r n r
i i r t ri r i i
t q t y q t q t y qae t y q t y
y y t yq t y q
− −∂ ⋅ ∂ ⋅   ∂    = − = − ⋅ = − ⋅ >∂ ∂ ∂ ⋅  
 
 
as, by definition (yi/qi)=nyr, tr(nyr)<tr(ryr) and the marginal tax rate is increasing w.r.t. income. 
As, by construction, the three methods at no tax area level must have the same no taxable 
income, we have that the quotient effect is stronger both than that of exemption and of tax credit, 
the income is higher; in the meanwhile the tax credit effect gets worse than either the quotient or the 
exemption one. 
In what it concerns the elasticity w.r.t. income of the non taxable income generated by the 
quotient, by definition it is: 
 
1
1
i
i r i r
i
i
i
i
i r i r
i
yy t q t
q
y
y
yy t q t
q
−
−
   ∂ −        ⋅∂
  −     
 (A9) 
 
On defining ( )( )1,ae q i r i r i iy t q t y q−= , we can write (A9) as: 
 
  
( )' ',
,
1 ii r ae q i r i
i
i ae q i
yy t y t y
q
y y
  − ⋅ ⋅    
−  (A9’) 
 
In order (A9’) is greater than 1, we must have: 
 
( )' ' , ,ir i r ae q i ae q i
i
yt y t y y
q
  ⋅ < ⋅  
 
 
                                                 
45 As g=t(w) is monotone, ( )[ ] ( )[ ]wtggt '11 =∂∂ − . 
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Then on dividing both sides of the above expression by ( )i r i iq t y q , and remembering that 
( ) ( ) ( ),i r i i i i r ae q iq t y q t y t y= = , we have immediately: 
 
( )
( )
'
'
, ,
,
i i
r
r ae q i ae q ii i
r ae q ii
r
i
y yt t y yq q
t yyt
q
  ⋅  ⋅  <   
 
 
Or, defining with ( )r iyη the elasticity of tax at income yi for the reference family (the single), the 
elasticity of non taxable income effect generated by the quotient is greater than 1, when:  
 
 ( ),ir r ae q i
i
y y
q
η η  <    (A10) 
 
Then when (A10) is verified, an increase of income generates a more than proportional increase of 
non taxable income; the contrary holds when the inequality sign in (A10) is reversed. 
Marginal tax rate increasing w.r.t. income: (iii) the number of shares into which the tax 
payer income y is divided 
Either for exemption or tax credit the number shares, into which the tax payer income y is 
divided, decreases w.r.t. y. In what it concerns the tax credit, from the definition of number of 
shares aqi(yi) we have that ( ) ( ) ( )( )/ 0i i i i r i i it y aq y t y aq y− ⋅ = . Let us now differentiate this 
expression w.r.t. y, imposing this function to remain constant (that is, equal to 0). Remembering that 
for the tax credit, ti(yi)= tr(yi)-ci, we get: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
'
' ' '
2 0
i i i i ii i
r i i i r i i r
i i i i i i
aq y aq y yy yt y aq y t aq y t
aq y aq y aq y
     − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ =             
 
  
from which it follows: 
 
 ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
' '
'
'
0
i
r i r
i i
i i
i i i
r
i i i i i i
yt y t
aq y
aq y
y y yt t
aq y aq y aq y
 −   = − <   ⋅ −      
 (A11) 
 
In (A11) both the numerator and the denominator are positive: the former because t’(w) increases 
w.r.t. its argument and the latter because by multiplying w times the marginal tax rate t’(w) we get 
something greater than the tax t(w). 
Analogously for the exemption, we differentiate ( ) ( ) ( ) 0r i i i i r i it y e aq y t y aq y− − ⋅ =   , w.r.t. y, 
keeping the equation to be constant, that is equal to zero, and we get: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
'
' ' '
2 0
i i i i ii i
r i i i i r i i r
i i i i i i
aq y aq y yy yt y e aq y t aq y t
aq y aq y aq y
     − ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ =             
 
 
from which: 
 ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
' '
'
'
0
i
r i i r
i i
i i
i i i
r
i i i i i
yt y e t
aq y
aq y
y y yt t
aq y aq y aq y
 − −   = − <   ⋅ −      
 (A12) 
 
In what it concerns the denominator in (A12) we note that still holds what we observed for the 
denominator in(A7); in what it concerns the numerator, if ( ) ( ) ( )( )/r i i i i r i i it y e aq y t y aq y− = ⋅ , then 
( ) ( )( )/r i i r i i it y e t y aq y− >  and consequently, when the marginal tax rate is increasing, 
( ) ( )( )' ' /r i i r i i it y e t y aq y− > . 
 
Moreover aqi(yi)exemption> aqi(yi)tax credit. Equating average tax rate, requests that for the tax credit:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )ir i i i i rtax credit i i tax credit
yt y c aq y t
aq y
  − = ⋅   
 
and analogously for the exemption: 
( ) ( ) ( )ir i i i i rexemption i i exemption
yt y e aq y t
aq y
  − = ⋅   
 
 
remember now that if, above the no tax area, tax saving for the exemption is greater that that for the 
tax credit, as ( ) ( )r i i r i it y e t y c− < − , it must be true that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i ii i r i i rexemption tax crediti i i iexemption tax credit
y yaq y t q y t
aq y aq y
     ⋅ < ⋅      
 
 
Now, with increasing marginal tax rate, when yi constant, the expression ( ) ( )( )/i i r i iaq y t y aq y⋅  
decreases as aqi(yi) increases46, from which it follows immediately that aqi(yi)exemption> aqi(yi)tax credit. 
 
 
Summarizing:  
 
− we have compared three instruments in order to decrease tax liability due to the presence 
of family burdens: family quotient, exemption and tax credit, all depending only on family 
characteristics and invariant with respect to income; 
                                                 
46 Note ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ) 0<⋅−=∂⋅∂ qytqyqytqqytq , because when the marginal tax rate is increasing w.r.t. income the 
tax for y/q is less than y/q times the marginal tax rate at y/q itself. 
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− for a given tax scheduling and established no tax area limits for each family typology, 
whatever instrument is us adopted for family charges: 
 
(1) with a constant marginal tax rate the three methods present the same effect;  
(2) when the marginal tax rate is increasing, the quotient is the most effective one in 
decreasing tax liability and the tax credit is the less effective one.  
Applications to actual income tax systems 
Actual income tax systems present marginal tax rates which are constant for a specific income 
interval, as described in the following Table A4. 
 
 
Table A4. Example of a tax system piecewise linear with increasing bracket tax rates 
 
Income interval Marginal tax rate Total tax at the upper interval limit Total tax 
y0<y ≤ L1 α1 T1 α1·(y- y0)= α1·y-β 
L1<y ≤ L2 α2 T2 T1+ α2·(y- L1) 
L2<y ≤ L3 α 3 T3 T2+ α3·(y- L2) 
L2<y ≤ L3 α 4 T4 T3+ α4·(y- L3) 
………. ………. ………. ………. 
LK<y αK+1  TK+ αK-1·(y- LK) 
Source: own calculations. 
 
For the sake of simplicity let’s suppose that ci and the parameter of the first bracket are such that 
ci < α1·y-β, for ∀ i. If we express the exemption ei and the quotient qi in terms of the tax credit ci, 
restricting the no tax area limit to be in any case the same for type i family, whatever the instrument 
adopted is, on the basis of Table A1, we have 1i ie c α=  and ( )i iq c β β= + , with 1 0yβ α= ⋅ .  
As long as yi lies in the first bracket, the situation is exactly the one tackled in Table A2, so the 
results there reported can be directly applied.  
Suppose now that yi lies in the second bracket, and that, always for the sake of simplicity, either ( )i iy e−  or i iy q still lies in the second bracket47. It is quite simple to verify that the application of 
the family exemption 1i ie c α=  implies a tax credit effect ( )2 1ic α α⋅ , greater than ci and it is 
immediate to check that either for exemption or for quotient the tax credit effect becomes larger as 
yi lifts into a higher bracket. Moreover the latter is greater than the former. 
In fact, starting from the tax generated by the quotient: 
 
 1 1 2 2 1i i
i
c L y L
c
β βα β α αβ β
 + ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + 
 (A13) 
 
after some simplifications, the tax credit effect of the quotient becomes ( ) ( )2 1 1 i iL c cα α β− ⋅ ⋅ + ; the 
inequality: 
( ) 22 1 1
1
i
i i
cL c c αα α β α− ⋅ ⋅ + > ⋅  
                                                 
47 If either ( )i iy e− or i iy q should shift into a lower bracket, the reported results hold a fortiori. 
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is verified, because 
( ) ( )2 1 1 2 1
1
L βα α α α α− ⋅ > − ⋅  
as 1 1L β α> . 
 
The exemption effect of the quotient is greater ei than and depends on income. 
Still in the case that either yi and i iy q lies in the second bracket, we must find aei(yi) s.t. the tax 
expressed as: 
 ( )1 1 2 1i i iL y ae y Lα β α  ⋅ − + ⋅ − −   
 
is equal to the tax expressed as in (A11). The solution for aei(yi) is: 
 
 ( ) ( )2 1 1
2 2
1 i
i i
cae y Lα α α α= − ⋅ +  (A14) 
 
(A14) is directly related to income, via the bracket in which the income itself lies, and is greater 
than 1i ie c α= ; in fact the inequality: 
 ( ) ( )2 1 1
2 2 1
1 i i
i i
c cae y Lα α α α α= − ⋅ + >  
is verified because 1 1iL c α> . 
In what it concerns the elasticity of tax, we only observe that in the system outlined in Table A4, 
we just observe that in an actual tax system it is not possible for the tax elasticity to have a 
monotonic behavior. In fact, let us consider the elasticity at Li and that at y= Li+∆, with ∆ s.t. 
Li+∆<Li+1. Defining: 
 
( )
i
ii
i T
LL ⋅= αη   ( ) ( )∆⋅+
∆+⋅=∆+
+
+
1
1
ii
ii
i T
LL α
αη  
 
Then ( ) ( )∆+> ii LL ηη  when ( )∆⋅+
∆+⋅>⋅
+
+
1
1
ii
ii
i
ii
T
L
T
L
α
αα  which, solved w.r.t. ∆, gives: 
  
 ( )( )11
i i i i
i i i i
T L
L T
α α
α α
+
+
⋅ ⋅ −∆ > ⋅ ⋅ −  (A15) 
 
Observe that in the r.h.s. of (A15) the denominator is positive.  
It follows that in an actual tax system it is not possible for the tax elasticity to be monotonically 
decreasing: ( ) ( )∆+> ii LL ηη  when ∆ is large enough to satisfy (A15), which depends on the 
difference between marginal tax rates for contiguous income intervals and on the length of the 
previous interval. Conversely, in order that ( ) ( )i iL Lη η< + ∆ , ∆ should be small enough to satisfy: 
  
 ( )( )11
i i i i
i i i i
T L
L T
α α
α α
+
+
⋅ ⋅ −∆ < ⋅ ⋅ −  (A15’) 
      
     
 
